My colleague Pete Leeson has a new book on pirates — the economic, social, and legal organization of pirate institutions, to be more precise. Pete is an incredibly creative young scholar. You can pre-order the book here from Princeton University Press (and you should do so; because it’s not yet released, pirated editions are few!). Here’s the publisher’s blurb:
Pack your cutlass and blunderbuss–it’s time to go a-pirating! The Invisible Hook
takes readers inside the wily world of late seventeenth- and early
eighteenth-century pirates. With swashbuckling irreverence and devilish
wit, Peter Leeson uncovers the hidden economics behind pirates’
notorious, entertaining, and sometimes downright shocking behavior. Why
did pirates fly flags of Skull & Bones? Why did they create a
"pirate code"? Were pirates really ferocious madmen? And what made them
so successful? The Invisible Hook uses economics to examine these and
other infamous aspects of piracy. Leeson argues that the pirate customs
we know and love resulted from pirates responding rationally to
prevailing economic conditions in the pursuit of profits.
The Invisible Hook
looks at legendary pirate captains like Blackbeard, Black Bart Roberts,
and Calico Jack Rackam, and shows how pirates’ search for plunder led
them to pioneer remarkable and forward-thinking practices. Pirates
understood the advantages of constitutional democracy–a model they
adopted more than fifty years before the United States did so. Pirates
also initiated an early system of workers’ compensation, regulated
drinking and smoking, and in some cases practiced racial tolerance and
equality. Leeson contends that pirates exemplified the virtues of
vice–their self-seeking interests generated socially desirable effects
and their greedy criminality secured social order. Pirates proved that
anarchy could be organized. Revealing the democratic and economic
forces propelling history’s most colorful criminals, The Invisible Hook establishes pirates’ trailblazing relevance to the contemporary world.
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Has it really been 10 years since Mancur Olson died and seven since the release of his last book (I think) "Power and Prosperity"? This treatise tends to get it backwards. People create (accept?) authority as it relates to their self interest. This is true I would guess in the case of pirates, where legitimacy is probably the greatest issue standing in the way of power. I would make the arguement that the democracy of pirates is probably a clearly visible smoke screen where the dissenter is thrown over board more times than not. It is hard for me to see these groups as nothing more than little dictatorships hiding their authority behind the veil of legit governance.
Orlando, you'll have to read the book. But pirates made strides in checks and balances in their governance structures. Captains had lots of control in combat and navagating, but quartermasters had lots of authority in daily ship operations. And because pirates had a common goal, namely punder, a captain could be judged by how good they were in realizing treasure (a somewhat objective measure). Leeson shows that corporal punishment was used far more often on navy ships, where sailors were drafted and pressed into service, then on pirate ships where you had volunteers and employment contracts.
But we should always keep in mind that these were hyper-violent murderers and thieves who raided towns and merchant shipping, so they didn't really believe in the absolute-ness of private property rights. To the extent that they captured or sank government ships and treasure, though, they were all right by me.