… is from page 250 of Axel Leijonhufvud’s 1981 collection, Information and Coordination: Essays in Macroeconomic Theory ^[1]; specifically, it’s from his superb chapter “Costs and Consequences of Inflation” (original emphasis):

In a regime of unstable money, it is not rational for people to rely on private contracts and agreements to the same extent as in a stable money regime.  The substitute instrumentality is political.  We expect people to use their votes and lobbies increasingly to help ensure for themselves a predictable real income.  Such activity may take the form of demands on the government itself for adjustment of taxes, for transfer payments, for “free” or subsidized government-provided services.

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