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This paper examines the relationship between behavioral law and economics (BLE) as a policy prescription platform and its influence on the regulations emerging from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). We show how these regulations are inconsistent with the intent and purpose of improving consumer choices. We further demonstrate that the selective modeling of behavioral bias in the BLE framework causes an overestimation of the ability of regulators, who in actuality use inefficient, heavy-handed rules based on little if any real empirical findings of “consumer irrationality.” Accordingly, the broader lesson on the misapplication of behavioral economics goes beyond the ill-considered policies emerging from the CFPB.
Over at EconLog, Alberto Mingardi discusses George Soros on speculation [4].
George Will is unimpressed with politicians’ efforts to help the poor [5]. A slice:
Nearly two-thirds of households receiving food stamps qualify under “categorical eligibility [6]” because they receive transportation assistance or certain other welfare services. We spend $1 trillion annually on federal welfare programs, decades after Daniel Patrick Moynihan [7] said that if one-third of the money for poverty programs was given directly to the poor, there would be no poor. But there also would be no unionized poverty bureaucrats prospering and paying dues that fund the campaigns of Democratic politicians theatrically heartsick about inequality.
Richard Epstein on property rights and the U.S. Constitution [8].
Cato’s Dan Mitchell proposes a new motto for Uncle Sam [9].
Gary Galles explains why he prefers the word “liberty” to “freedom.” [10]