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… is from page 38 of GMU Law professor Michael Greve’s excellent 2015 monograph, Federalism and the Constitution: Competition versus Cartels [2] (original emphasis):
Education programs support educators, and children only secondarily; Medicaid supports providers; highway grants support the concrete lobby and construction unions; and so on…. The intended effect of federal transfer programs is to feed a vast intergovernmental bureaucracy and its nominally private clientele. Those constituencies, in turn, provide political support for the programs and lobby for their expansion.
Education programs support educators, and children only secondarily; Medicaid supports providers; highway grants support the concrete lobby and construction unions; and so on…. The intended effect of federal transfer programs is to feed a vast intergovernmental bureaucracy and its nominally private clientele. Those constituencies, in turn, provide political support for the programs and lobby for their expansion.