That's so weird – I was watching this video just the other day!
Honestly, watching this made me leery of him, if he really thinks this. His criticism of social sciences is an example of people who say that organic food is better for you. First, it's a bizarre example because that's not something that social science even covers! That's a question for a biologist, not a social scientist. Perhaps a social commentator – and in that sense I'd agree with Feynman on a lot of people who act as social commentators on different issues. But that seems to be a whole different animal from social science.
His first critique, though, that social sciences don't come up with laws is ridiculous too. Law of supply and demand? As was posted here recently, that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market? There are some clear bedrock conclusions that I think we can be comfortable calling laws. Then on top of these few bedrock laws there are a variety of theories that have been tested against the data and evaluated for decades.
I think Fenyman is also a bit off because he's looking at things from the perspective of physics, which has much crisper measurements of its subject than just about all other sciences, with the possible exception of chemistry. I think the social sciences are much more naturally compared to biology than physics. This only makes sense – after all, humans are animals. What "laws" are there in biology? Perhaps evolution by natural selection, but even our understanding of exactly how evolution and even the genome works is changing all the time. So there are few "laws" per se, but there's tremendously rigorous modeling, testing, descriptiong, recording, etc.
I can't speak for all social scientists, but economists clearly follow a scientific method. They have better measures for what they're studying than some other disciplines (biology, for example), and they test theorie with data – AND their theories seem to describe the world relatively well. I'm not sure what else Fenyman is looking for.
I had sociology training in college as well as economics training, and these criticisms could certainly be leveled against some sociologists, who are more social commentators than scientists. But even in that very wishy-washy discipline, a lot of sociologists still to a lot of good scientific work.
No science is going to have a degree of precision approaching physics, but that's a function of the problems being studied. In a lot of ways, physicists are studying the easy things – the well defined things. No wonder they can be more precise. But that doesn't mean others – including other undisputed scientists like biologists – aren't doing science as well. Science is about how you approach a question to answer it, and faithfully adhering to the method. I'm not sure what Fenyman has done to prove that social scientists aren't doing science except for saying: "I see how they get their information and I can't believe they don't know that they haven't done the work necessary"… hmmm… there's not really too much behind that accusation Mr. Fenyman
Lee KellyJune 4, 2009 at 3:04 pm
A law is just a proposition with no exceptions, or, in other words, a true proposition. Some laws are more informative than others, i.e. they preclude more possible occurrences.
The laws of social sciences tend to be less informative, and many, while true, require an inhuman feat of information gathering to fill the initial conditions. Often, we know laws of how things operate in principle, but such laws cannot be harnessed for practical application, because there is no way of performing the necessary measurements. Usually we just grope in the dark.
Models just ignore this problem by reducing the number of variables, and although they may illustrate laws and principles which are true, one should avoid applying their results to reality. They are like metaphors, and we all know what happens when a metaphor is pushed too far.
Daniel KuehnJune 4, 2009 at 3:07 pm
Lee Kelly -
Right, I agree with all that (well perhaps not "models just ignore this problem"… I think "models do their best to deal with this problem" is significantly more accurate).
But what in the world does this have to do with whether the social sciences are a science or not? Exactly what laws of biology are there? What about geology? The only sciences that are heavily law-based are physics and chemistry as far as I can tell. And to the extent that biology or geology have laws, they're usually laws of physics or chemistry operating on the molecular level – so they're not really specific to biology and geology.
I suppose my concern is that such an eminent scientist as Fenyman seems to have a very strange understanding of what science is!
Lee KellyJune 4, 2009 at 3:09 pm
A law is just a proposition with no exceptions, or, in other words, a true proposition. – Me
I don't actually mean that, but it's close enough. The difference doesn't matter.
Lee KellyJune 4, 2009 at 3:20 pm
A lot of intellectuals like to argue that whatever they're doing, it's science; but it's mostly prestige and authority of science they crave.
Arguing "what science really is" is futile and irrelevant, because it's just a word–a matter of convention.
There are many different methods and goals, and whether or not economics or sociology qualify as "science" is not particularly important, or at least it is not important to me. If they are not science, so what? Nothing changes, and any truth and wisdom to be found there yesterday is still there today.
Daniel KuehnJune 4, 2009 at 3:20 pm
RE: "I don't actually mean that, but it's close enough. The difference doesn't matter."
I understand – I didn't take your post to be a scientific law I got the gist
Fantastic video. Looks like he was well ahead of the curve on Taleb. Daniel – Excellent work with the typewriter.
Lee KellyJune 4, 2009 at 3:26 pm
Daniel,
When I stated that models just ignore the problem, I meant that they are typically, and necessarily, insensitive to the wealth of variables which exist in reality.
Modellers are the ones who try to deal with the problem, albeit often wrongly, in my opinion. Rather than deal with the problem by recasting their models as metaphors, and unavoidably inadequate for social engineering purposes, they try and overcome the problem by introducing complexities. Their models are still not adequate, and now they fail as useful metaphors, too.
Daniel KuehnJune 4, 2009 at 3:33 pm
Seth -
RE: "Fantastic video. Looks like he was well ahead of the curve on Taleb. Daniel – Excellent work with the typewriter."
Was Fenyman really that impressive to you, Seth? "my advantage is that I know a lot of things"… "some people tell you organic food is better for you"… "the problem is there are no laws". What exactly was in there that impressed or convinced you, I'm really very curious? His qualifications for being a science seemed to be: (1.) you have laws, and (2.) you are really thorough about checking your results. It amazes me that that is so impressive to you, Seth. This man is a Nobel laureate. I think it's a little embarassing that that's the way he judges whether something is science.
Lee Kelly
RE: "Arguing "what science really is" is futile and irrelevant, because it's just a word–a matter of convention."
Certainly there are limits to where this conversation can go. But give me a break – there is a well accepted scientific method. There are well accepted conventions of scientific ethics. It's not about "prestige". Are social scientists following the scientific method and achieving reasonable results from it or not? It's a very, very simple question. Simply saying it's for prestige doesn't make it so. Economists formulate theories based on prior knowledge, try to falsify those theories with empirical data, and evaluate the robustness of their results. Fenyman can whine all he wants about whether he thinks that's up to snuff, but if it's not science – please enlighten me as to what it is.
RE: "If they are not science, so what? Nothing changes, and any truth and wisdom to be found there yesterday is still there today."
I don't know philosophy of knowledge or anything, but in this world there is a lot of "truth" that gets proclaimed – and a lot is misleading. The scientific method has done a fantastic job guaranteeing that the "truths" we develop are as real and useful as possible. Making sure that social scientists stick to the scientific method (because clearly not all of them do) I think can make the difference between good information and bad. I don't dwell on it either, but that seems to be worthwhile to me.
Greg RansomJune 4, 2009 at 3:36 pm
Earth to Feynman: there are no "laws" in Darwian biology, either.
Feynman — just ONE MORE physicist who is a very bad philosopher or scientist of science.
Feynman is right if you are talking about Samuelsonial economics. Not so much if you are talking about the science of Adam Smith or Friedrich Hayek.
Greg RansomJune 4, 2009 at 3:38 pm
The "laws" picture of science comes from outside of science — it comes from philosophers of science like John Stuart Mill.
Feynman is give us false philosopher of science's picture of "science — he isn't giving us a true picture of actual science in all of its richness across disciplines.
Perhaps a simpler approach to this question of science vs. scientism is to apple a little Karl Popper. Can you theory be falsified with experiment or observation? If it falls into the "all swans are white" kind of hypothesis, then yes, and therefore, you might be practicing science. If it falls into the "does god exist" kind of hypothesis, than you are probably not practicing science. Those are extremes.
So, on that spectrum, where would one put "government deficit spending can be used to stabilize and re-equilibrate a depressed economy by raising total expenditures back to levels of natural real GDP"? Or better, "is war effective stimulus for the economy?"
It would appear on these questions that the answers one derives from the available data depend more on the prior biases of the one reviewing the data then on any kind of objective review of the evidence.
The counter-examples and refutations in history of Keynesian theory appear numerous and extensive. Does that make keynesianism a pseudo-science or am I suffering confirmation bias? I believe the former, but if I am subject to the latter I would still believe the former.
Lee KellyJune 4, 2009 at 3:48 pm
Daniel,
Some methods are better than others for achieving particular goals. The "scientific method", or whatever passes for it these days, may not be the best method for you.
And that's why I do not care all that much what passes as "science" to everyone else, because I do not think that their methods are congruent with my goals, i.e. to learn the truth. That may seem strange, but there is what scientists say, and there is what scientists do, and one doesn't necessarily have much to do with the other–like politicians, I suppose.
Daniel KuehnJune 4, 2009 at 3:49 pm
Greg -
RE: "Feynman is right if you are talking about Samuelsonial economics. Not so much if you are talking about the science of Adam Smith or Friedrich Hayek."
Now this is interesting… I appreciate Smith and Hayek both a great deal, but I don't really think of them as scientists per se. I take that back – I suppose they could be thought of as theoretical scientists. But the corpus of their work cetainly isn't traditional science. In this sense both Smith and Hayek have a great deal in common with Samuelson.
Theoretical physicists, theoretical biologists, and theoretical economists are all well and good – but science seems to require some attempt at testing and falsification. If I were to think about economic scientists, I would probably think of empirical economists first.
Interesting on where the idea of "laws" came from in science. I didn't know that. It seems to me that presupposing the existence of "laws" and evaluating something on the basis of whether those imagined laws are discovered is actually anti-scientific!!!
The Other EricJune 4, 2009 at 3:50 pm
"…and they test theories with data – AND their theories seem to describe the world relatively well. I'm not sure what else Fenyman is looking for."
He was referring to historians, sociologists, political 'scientists' and a raft of others who never, ever test the half-baked notions they suggest as "theories" — often without any model or construct that can be used for even the most cursory measure of accuracy.
Were he alive today Feynman would appreciate behavioral and other recent developments in economics and other fields because they rely on data and can be tested. His work, like that on electrodynamics, was based on models that could be proven with evidence. His meetings with social science folks, like those at SUNY, were marked by a lack of common descriptive language, let alone real data and testable assumptions. Post-modern navel gazing was not for him.
Daniel KuehnJune 4, 2009 at 3:52 pm
I suppose Hayek and Smith and Samuelson and Keynes are our Einsteins, but Friedman and Heckman and Mincer are our Oppenheimers. I should take back what I said above – it's not that Hayek and Smith aren't scientists… I'm just curious why you highlighted them and opposed them to Samuelson.
Is it because you don't think Samuelson did [theoretical] science, or because you don't like what he said?
Daniel KuehnJune 4, 2009 at 3:58 pm
John Papola -
RE: "It would appear on these questions that the answers one derives from the available data depend more on the prior biases of the one reviewing the data then on any kind of objective review of the evidence."
Why in the world would you say this? Either deficits help or they don't. GDP and deficits are both measurable. There will be methodological battles over spurious relationships and measurement error and that sort of thing. But these are at base scientific and methodological questions to be answered. You need to sketch out better exactly what obstacle you see to answering these questions with science. I have no idea where you're coming from.
RE: "The counter-examples and refutations in history of Keynesian theory appear numerous and extensive. Does that make keynesianism a pseudo-science or am I suffering confirmation bias? I believe the former, but if I am subject to the latter I would still believe the former."
Yes, this is why they don't teach the General Theory verbatim any more. Some elements of Keynesianism have been shown to be false, and they are no longer accepted by economists. Some have evidence in their favor – including that deficits can help to re-equilibrate a deperessed economy, so they have stayed (albeit we've obviously found out that the multiplier is substantially smaller than what Keynes thought it was). That's science – theories get refined when the evidence comes in.
Lee KellyJune 4, 2009 at 4:00 pm
Greg,
A law expresses a relation between variables. You plug values in and derive propositions about the world. If your law is true, and the values you plug in, i.e. the initial conditions, are also true, then you will get a true result.
In physics, the kind of observations you need to make to gather and test your initial conditions are relatively simple, and less time is spent arguing about it. In economics, the kind of observations you need to make to gather and test your initial conditions are impossible. Variables that you do not even know to look for often skew the results you get, and although this problem still exists for physics, it is more acute in economics.
There are laws, that is, true relations which we may understand in principle, but they offer precious little guidance for economic intervention or engineering.
Lee KellyJune 4, 2009 at 4:03 pm
A law expresses a relation between variables. You plug values in and derive propositions about the world. If your law is true, and the values you plug in, i.e. the initial conditions, are also true, then you will get a true result. – Me
Assumptions are made about the variables which were never measured, it's just that you do not necessarily realise you are making them.
Daniel KuehnJune 4, 2009 at 4:03 pm
The Other Eric -
RE: "His meetings with social science folks, like those at SUNY, were marked by a lack of common descriptive language, let alone real data and testable assumptions. Post-modern navel gazing was not for him."
Perhaps he just met with a bad bunch. But "real data and testable assumptions" existed in the social sciences long before Feynman died – indeed, long before he was even born.
Perhaps it was an odd post-modern navel gazer that gave him the wrong impression – I get the impression that his experience with post-modern navel gazers has more to do with what he said in this clip than any objective engagement with the social sciences. And in Fenyman's defense, he very clearly admited "I could be completely wrong".
yet another DaveJune 4, 2009 at 4:09 pm
Are social scientists following the scientific method and achieving reasonable results from it or not?
Well, it's not really as simple a question as you think. Social scientists try to follow something similar to the scientific method, but they can only go so far. They can formulate a falsifiable hypotheses, and try to design an experiment to test the hypothesis. The problem is too many variables – you simply cannot do a controlled experiment. The social sciences depend on analysis of data with many changing variables, many of which are unknown. Even with methods to mitigate the risk, it's all too easy to come to false conclusions as a result.
Daniel KuehnJune 4, 2009 at 4:09 pm
Lee Kelly -
RE: "Assumptions are made about the variables which were never measured, it's just that you do not necessarily realise you are making them."
I don't know if you have any experience with econometrics, but the entire empirical endeavor turns on what assumptions you make. People are very cognizant of this. This is true of any non-experimental empirical science (it's easier to ignore the unmeasured variable in experiments… indeed, that's why experiments are so great when you can get them!).
Meteorologists, many biologists, most geologists, many physicists have this problem as well. So do economists and sociologists. Psychologists (like many physicists and probably all chemists) are not very constrained by this problem you bring up because they can experiment.
What exactly is your point? We're all very aware of the constraints of non-experimental empirical work. This isn't a new or unheard of constraint, and it hardly prevents anyone from doing science.
The biggest problem with social sciences is (like a lot of things in biology) the subject is trickier to measure. That's a limitation, but it doesn't preclude scientific investigation.
Daniel KuehnJune 4, 2009 at 4:16 pm
yet another Dave -
1. What in the world do experiments have to do with science?
2. True, social scientists have "many many variables"… so? This is all really disturbing to me. Science is a process and the limitations on the process (like "lost of variables" or "weak measurement") certainly impact the robustness of the results, but what do "lots of variables" have to do with whether or not it's scientific… perhaps I should ask it this way: at what number of variables do we stop considering something to be a science??
3. You say "it's all too easy to come to false conclusions as a result". I agree… when you're calculating what percentage of the galaxy is made up of dark matter "it's all too easy to come to false conclusions" as well. You also can't do experiments and there are many relevant variables that we cannot measure. Nobody accuses the people looking into dark matter of being non-scientists.
So to sum up, I suppose I'm saying I have no idea what your points have to do with whether something is a science or not.
Greg RansomJune 4, 2009 at 4:32 pm
Daniel Kuehn — like Feynman, you picture of "science" comes from the philosophers and the philosophical tradition. It doesn't come from real science.
As I've pointed out in my paper on Hayek's explanatory strategy — economics gives us the same set of explanatory alternatives as does the problem of adaptation in the biological world. go to my Hayek blog and look for the link to my paper on Hayek's explanatory strategy in economics.
Feynman found overlooked and nuanced mistakes by physicists in physics experiments (who also happened to be human), a field you refer to as precise.
I can see where he would be skeptical of the quality of "experimental" designs in social science. No matter the experiment, humans design them.
Greg RansomJune 4, 2009 at 4:35 pm
Lee Kelly — I don't buy your picture of "science" either in Darwinian biology or in economics.
There are no fixed 2 relation causal variables subject to "laws" in these sciences — the explanatory element in economics is entrepreneurial learning in the context of changing relative prices and local conditions and these aren't relations between "variables" in an sense that helps thought, rather than obstruct it.
Daniel KuehnJune 4, 2009 at 4:40 pm
Greg Ransom -
RE: "Daniel Kuehn — like Feynman, you picture of "science" comes from the philosophers and the philosophical tradition. It doesn't come from real science."
You might want to explain exactly what you mean by this. I do borrow somewhat from Popper, but I'm not a strict Popperian. Form a theory based on prior knowledge – test it (perhaps falsifying a la Popper but this isn't absolutely necessary I supporse) with data (either experimentally or non-experimentally), and evaluate the result. I have no doubt some philosophers of science agree with me on that… but I don't see the difference between this and "real science". Perhaps you could explain where I'm erring.
RE: "As I've pointed out in my paper on Hayek's explanatory strategy — economics gives us the same set of explanatory alternatives as does the problem of adaptation in the biological world."
Yes… this is why I'm fond of Hayek.
RE: "There are no fixed 2 relation causal variables subject to "laws" in these sciences"
Good lord – you sound like dg lesvic now.
Tell me – why is this definition what "science is". Give me a reason why I should believe that this definition is anything more than a regurgitated Mises quote.
yet another DaveJune 4, 2009 at 4:42 pm
Jeeeeeze DK, you're gonna have a heart attack before you're 30. Relax!
You asked a question, saying it was "a very, very simple question." I responded to that, because it's not quite that simple. I did not say social sciences weren't science. I did not say any of the things you spewed on about. You should avoid jumping to conclusions.
Perhaps I could have started with the statement that social sciences suffer from a higher level of uncertainty than physical sciences. Would that have not upset your sensibilities?
Daniel KuehnJune 4, 2009 at 4:50 pm
yet another Dave -
RE: "Jeeeeeze DK, you're gonna have a heart attack before you're 30. Relax!"
?????
RE: "I did not say social sciences weren't science. I did not say any of the things you spewed on about. You should avoid jumping to conclusions."
Oh I knew that – I was more not sure what it had to do with the issue of whether they were a science or not. Take your experimental point. It seems to me that that's a complete non sequitor. I know you aren't making any clear delineations on whether it's a science or not, I was just confused about the relevance of a few of your statements.
RE: "Would that have not upset your sensibilities?"
My sensibilities are fine – you seem to be taking my response rather harshly, though. Maybe I should blunt it a little more. Certainly there is a great deal more uncertainty in the social sciences – in that I agree, and I hope I haven't been giving the impression I deny that (in fact I think I've said they're less precise). I wasn't trying to challenge you on that.
"Why in the world would you say this? Either deficits help or they don't. GDP and deficits are both measurable."
Indeed they are. But is measurability what makes something "scientific". I'm not sure that's adequate.
Plus, the time horizon is fungible and causality vs. correlation is hard to disentangle. A keynesian could say "look, Bush's deficit spending created an economic boom and re-equilibrated the economy post-dot bomb". Is that true or false? Well, the boom didn't last, so how you define the timeframe impacts the results. Then the question becomes what caused the bust and was the bust inevitably as the result of the boom, etc, etc.
Was the 1960's an era of genuine prosperity resulting from economic fine-tuning, or was it the boom before the bust of the 70's inflationary depression?
Science seeks to find the laws that dictate the behavior of the natural world in a way that can reliably be used for prediction. Testing predictions is, in fact, a crucial element of real science.
Keynesian and Monetarist macro-economics, on the other hand, appear to extract ex-post equations from analysis of aggregate behavioral data. They are statistics applied to the past, not theories with strong predictive power for the future.
The multiplier is probably the best example of ex-post data. How do the current or past propensity of people on average to spend or save likely to predict their intentions in the future? Can you honestly say that such a metric has any predictive power whatsoever, given that the social conditions that influence these human choices are not likely to be repeated?
"That's science – theories get refined when the evidence comes in."
And what of the broad disagreements that remain in all of these areas? As Russ has pointed out repeatedly, he's not aware of many instances where new research has drawn strong conversion. J K Galbraith or Paul Krugman show no signs of skepticism that real science should help provide.
I do think that there are micro-economic laws, especially in terms of scarcity being a reality and the impacts of supply, demand and relative prices. Macro, on the other hand… not so much.
Of course, I am neither an economist nor a scientist, but simply a geeky fan of both disciplines.
"Why in the world would you say this? Either deficits help or they don't. GDP and deficits are both measurable."
Indeed they are. But is measurability what makes something "scientific". I'm not sure that's adequate.
Plus, the time horizon is fungible and causality vs. correlation is hard to disentangle. A keynesian could say "look, Bush's deficit spending created an economic boom and re-equilibrated the economy post-dot bomb". Is that true or false? Well, the boom didn't last, so how you define the timeframe impacts the results. Then the question becomes what caused the bust and was the bust inevitably as the result of the boom, etc, etc.
Was the 1960's an era of genuine prosperity resulting from economic fine-tuning, or was it the boom before the bust of the 70's inflationary depression?
Science seeks to find the laws that dictate the behavior of the natural world in a way that can reliably be used for prediction. Testing predictions is, in fact, a crucial element of real science.
Keynesian and Monetarist macro-economics, on the other hand, appear to extract ex-post equations from analysis of aggregate behavioral data. They are statistics applied to the past, not theories with strong predictive power for the future.
The multiplier is probably the best example of ex-post data. How do the current or past propensity of people on average to spend or save likely to predict their intentions in the future? Can you honestly say that such a metric has any predictive power whatsoever, given that the social conditions that influence these human choices are not likely to be repeated?
"That's science – theories get refined when the evidence comes in."
And what of the broad disagreements that remain in all of these areas? As Russ has pointed out repeatedly, he's not aware of many instances where new research has drawn strong conversion. J K Galbraith or Paul Krugman show no signs of skepticism that real science should help provide.
I do think that there are micro-economic laws, especially in terms of scarcity being a reality and the impacts of supply, demand and relative prices. Macro, on the other hand… not so much.
Of course, I am neither an economist nor a scientist, but simply a geeky fan of both disciplines.
Where I do believe that physics informs economics is in the laws of thermodynamics. You can't create matter, only change it. Printing money and deficit spending cannot create new productive capacity. It can only re-distribute it through distortions in relative prices and time compressions where future investments are foregone in favor of current investments plus future debt servicing.
Daniel KuehnJune 4, 2009 at 5:14 pm
John -
RE: "Indeed they are. But is measurability what makes something "scientific". I'm not sure that's adequate."
Who said it was? My point is you said the answer to your question was based in biases. I'm saying it is measured and tested in very objective ways. Measurement in and of itself isn't sufficient to be a science. Nobody is saying it is.
RE: "Plus, the time horizon is fungible and causality vs. correlation is hard to disentangle."
Of course.
RE: "A keynesian could say "look, Bush's deficit spending created an economic boom and re-equilibrated the economy post-dot bomb". Is that true or false? Well, the boom didn't last, so how you define the timeframe impacts the results. Then the question becomes what caused the bust and was the bust inevitably as the result of the boom, etc, etc."
How should I know if that's true or false? You haven't presented the theory this keynesian is testing, the data he used, his methodology, or his results. If the data and methodology are sound and he found this, it may be tentative evidence, but it sounds like scientific evidence to me. Either way, you really can't make this argument without talking about his theory, data, methods, and results.
RE: "Keynesian and Monetarist macro-economics, on the other hand, appear to extract ex-post equations from analysis of aggregate behavioral data."
I think you have this history backwards. The great theoretical expositions of both Keynesianism and Monetarism were created before they were tested by data. Both were partially falsified, and both have been reworked and retested because they failed a number of empirical tests.
RE: "Can you honestly say that such a metric has any predictive power whatsoever, given that the social conditions that influence these human choices are not likely to be repeated?"
This is a limitation – that social sciences are very very rarely experimental. I'm not sure why you think exact replication of conditions is necessary for science to move forward. LOTS of science doesn't have exact replication. But there are non-experimental empirical methods to approximate replication of conditions. Again – lots of science outside economics relies on these non-experimental methods.
RE: "And what of the broad disagreements that remain in all of these areas?"
Yes, if you're squeemish about broad disagreements, science probably isn't appropriate for you.
RE: "J K Galbraith or Paul Krugman show no signs of skepticism that real science should help provide"
I'm not sure what you mean by this. Krugman got a Nobel prize because his work on intra-industry trade overturned preconceptions he had about international trade. Granted – he is a fairly recalcitrant partisan… but I'm not sure his hatred of Bush et al. means he's not going to be convinced by new empirical resutls. Do you?
RE: "Where I do believe that physics informs economics is in the laws of thermodynamics."
Samuelson agreed heartily with this… to bring your point around to one made by Greg Ransom earlier.
RE: "Printing money and deficit spending cannot create new productive capacity. It can only re-distribute it through distortions in relative prices and time compressions where future investments are foregone in favor of current investments plus future debt servicing."
I generally agree with this "you can't create matter only change it"… printing money DOES cause inflation. But the story isn't as simple as that. One thing that does differentiate economics from physics is that when we deal with humans – when we deal with the social sciences – human perception of reality is as relevant as the reality itself. So yes, printing money causes inflation. But printing money can also create productive capacity because of it's impact on human psychology… maybe… at least that's how the theory goes. Either way, humans are not machines. The thermodynamic analogy works impressively well in most cases, but it is still just an analogy. I think these extra behavioral complications are what makes economics so interesting.
Goodnight everyone!
Lee KellyJune 4, 2009 at 5:29 pm
Greg,
My picture of science? I don't even care anymore. And I doesn't matter how many variables are involved, or whatever you want to call it. My point was just a simple matter of logic.
Lee KellyJune 4, 2009 at 5:31 pm
That's a limitation, but it doesn't preclude scientific investigation. – Daniel
Sure, and I never said it did.
Martin BrockJune 4, 2009 at 7:41 pm
… printing money DOES cause inflation.
Printing too much money causes inflation, but all money ultimately is printed or minted or something.
Ideally, money appears as needed to denominate the current value of goods with real value and disappears when goods with real value disappear or do not materialize as expected. Basically, we create currency to extend credit for the purchase of valuable goods and remove currency from circulation if goods of comparable value do not replace depreciating goods.
… printing money can also create productive capacity because of it's impact on human psychology…
I ordinarily think of the goods preceding the money, but you do have a point in modernity. Only a few generations ago, if I needed credit to become productive, I didn't therefore need money. On the frontier, when I found arable land, I staked a claim, and I recruited a neighbor to help me clear it. My neighbor helped me knowing that I'd share fruits with him later. If I needed a mule and a plow, I'd borrow them on similar terms.
Nowadays, I need money to buy land, money to hire help clearing the land, money to buy a tractor and gasoline, so I need credit to obtain this money. I could, in principle, ask this credit of landowners, manual laborers, tractor and gasoline salesman. I could barter my future fruits for these current goods, but I wouldn't think of obtaining the goods this way, and others probably wouldn't barter with me this way if I did.
So my need for money really is psychological, reflecting my psychological expectations and my neighbors' psychology as well.
K AckermannJune 4, 2009 at 8:14 pm
Feynman is exactly correct. I think it's his tone that is throwing people off.
Feynman didn't exactly hold philosophy up as a hard science either. He is just differentiating between hard and soft science.
Look at the vast differences in economic thought. When the hard sciences are split on an issue, that is an exciting time for them. It provides a real opportunity to get to the bottom of the problem.
Many of the social sciences tend to relish divergent opinions, and often display ideological biases. There are isomorphisms everywhere in competing social theories, but often, they are willfully ignored after adopting an ideological stand.
The soft sciences are broadly subjective because they have to be. History is not always accurately recorded, and observation is often tainted by bias.
Some people here are labeled socialists as though there were an objective, clearly delineated thing.
Some economists will tell you with a straight face that lowering taxes will fix economies, as though the government taxes and never spends the money.
Oh, but it's inefficient that way. Really? How much has weather satellites helped efficiency?
Regulations are bad, they add a tax to businesses. Really? Merck can claim the FDA is a royal drag on their company, but their company would have been sued into oblivion if it were not for the FDA.
I think that's what Feynman was getting at. Making judgements of truth based on first-order observation.
A scientific law is a law that should be taken to be universally applicable. It attempts to describe an observation in nature and applies to all of the different sciences.
A scientific law is a theory that has been tested and is believed to be true. Laws are usually used in Physics, whereas in Biology and Chemistry, the same definition is used to describe a scientific theory.
Hence,
The law of gravity
The theory of evolution
Both are considered to be true in equal amounts, it's just a difference in terminology.
Hooray, no more arguing about the topic!
But really, I'm with K Ackermann on this part at least…
"He is just differentiating between hard and soft science."
My two cents are that scientific laws are statements that describe a certain event under certain SET circumstances. For instance, the four laws of thermodynamics:
0. Definition of Temperature
1. Conservation of Energy
2. Entropy of a closed system increases
3. Absolute zero entropy (impossibility of absolute zero)
These laws do not say why this occurs, only that these occur. There are no biases associated with these and they are not open for interpretation.
Medicines containing derivatives of salicylic acid, structurally similar to aspirin, have been in medical use since ancient times. Salicylate-rich willow bark extract became recognized for its specific effects on fever, pain and inflammation in the mid-eighteenth century. By the nineteenth century pharmacists were experimenting with and prescribing a variety of chemicals related to salicylic acid, the active component of willow extract. – Wikipedia
Thank nature for producing the Willow tree. The birds and the bees uses the tree for lodging and sustenance The bark was used as we use aspirin today for a variety of ailments such as headaches. Swallowing an electrode or diode will only make you sick.
It is natural for Feynman or anyone to think that what they do is paramount. He didn't strike me as overly arrogant, so it's okay for him to think that what he does has more relevance and is more "real" or tangible than what the other fellow does. Millions of people believe in absurd religious beliefs and kill one another over it. Why do physicists work for the evilest people and most theocratic regimes in the world to make the most destructive nuclear weapons? A physicist without a soul is a piece of garbage. And that is coming from someone who quivers when people mention the human "soul" and deny it to other living things. Moral philosophy is light years ahead of the amoral physicist or evil 3rd world dictator. Physics is not the end all and be all of enlightenment. People cope with gravity without even knowing it exists. Physicists know that it exists and how it works but don't know what's "behind" it. Religions seek to explain the world but tell incredible stories to do so. Science should defeat mythology, but has failed to do so in the minds of the masses. That is why we are on the brink of WWIII. The world is a nightmare for which there is no awakening from or escaping. It's here to stay until it's no longer here. You can quote me on that.
redbudJune 5, 2009 at 2:53 am
Excellent discussions! There are some brilliant folks in this blog.
My view, there is always a blend of ART and SCIENCE in learning, in business, in life, since conditions do change and powerful forces rule. Navigating the motion in the ocean — waves that forever build, roll, and collapse — is an ART which SCIENCE supports.
vikingvistaJune 5, 2009 at 3:27 am
Von Mises's _Human Action_ is a pretty compelling explanation about why social "sciences" are as Feynman describes, and what a proper approach to them might look like.
And I agree. Feynman is right. But I'm still enthralled by history and economics.
I don't get it, he's right about what? His example isn't even really social science (unless medicine is a social science…?). What is it he calls social science?
Ok, maybe I get it now, social science was just an example of what he thinks is not real science, and "organic food science" is another example of pseudo-science.
Is this how I should be interpreting this post+video?
Daniel KuehnJune 5, 2009 at 6:23 am
Mathieu -
Nah, don't give him that much credit
A lot of people have talked about the biases of the social sciences. What I think is most strikingly obvious about the clip was that this is really just the expression of previously held biases about social sciences. As others have noted as well, his one example isn't even social science. Other than that his argument amounts to "they don't have laws" and "they don't work as hard". I know this was somewhat of a casual statement on his part – fine. But it's not a Nobelesque exposition of science by any stretch of the imagination.
Re: Mises on "Physics is an empirical science. Economics is a deductive science."
It's worth noting that Mises takes the liberty of rejecting all empirical economics, therefore this definition of his is not really a statement about what economics is, but what he thinks economics ought to be. Readers shouldn't confuse that – Mises can't possible claim that empirical work isn't done in economics.
vikingvistaJune 5, 2009 at 9:06 am
You can do empirical work in astrology or eugenics too. That doesn't make them science.
Another point addressed nicely in _Human Action_. Feynman was talking about scientism.
RichJune 5, 2009 at 9:34 am
Surely you're joking, Mr. Feynman!
Daniel KuehnJune 5, 2009 at 9:37 am
vikingvista -
RE: "You can do empirical work in astrology or eugenics too. That doesn't make them science."
OK… but you could say this about physics or chemistry too. This critique, to be quite honest, is absolutely meaningless.
You are right to point out that empirical work is only worth while if cause and effect actually have some sort of real causal relationship. Sure – of course.
Do they have a real causal relationship in astrology? No.
Do they have a real causal relationship in economics? That's the question. I think even Mises would have to answer "yes". And if they have some underlying real causal relationship, how is applying the scientific method to understand and quantify that relationship inappropriate?
In other words – you make a true but trivial statement. The question is – why in the world would you assume that economics is analagous to astrology rather than biology?
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That's so weird – I was watching this video just the other day!
Honestly, watching this made me leery of him, if he really thinks this. His criticism of social sciences is an example of people who say that organic food is better for you. First, it's a bizarre example because that's not something that social science even covers! That's a question for a biologist, not a social scientist. Perhaps a social commentator – and in that sense I'd agree with Feynman on a lot of people who act as social commentators on different issues. But that seems to be a whole different animal from social science.
His first critique, though, that social sciences don't come up with laws is ridiculous too. Law of supply and demand? As was posted here recently, that the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market? There are some clear bedrock conclusions that I think we can be comfortable calling laws. Then on top of these few bedrock laws there are a variety of theories that have been tested against the data and evaluated for decades.
I think Fenyman is also a bit off because he's looking at things from the perspective of physics, which has much crisper measurements of its subject than just about all other sciences, with the possible exception of chemistry. I think the social sciences are much more naturally compared to biology than physics. This only makes sense – after all, humans are animals. What "laws" are there in biology? Perhaps evolution by natural selection, but even our understanding of exactly how evolution and even the genome works is changing all the time. So there are few "laws" per se, but there's tremendously rigorous modeling, testing, descriptiong, recording, etc.
I can't speak for all social scientists, but economists clearly follow a scientific method. They have better measures for what they're studying than some other disciplines (biology, for example), and they test theorie with data – AND their theories seem to describe the world relatively well. I'm not sure what else Fenyman is looking for.
I had sociology training in college as well as economics training, and these criticisms could certainly be leveled against some sociologists, who are more social commentators than scientists. But even in that very wishy-washy discipline, a lot of sociologists still to a lot of good scientific work.
No science is going to have a degree of precision approaching physics, but that's a function of the problems being studied. In a lot of ways, physicists are studying the easy things – the well defined things. No wonder they can be more precise. But that doesn't mean others – including other undisputed scientists like biologists – aren't doing science as well. Science is about how you approach a question to answer it, and faithfully adhering to the method. I'm not sure what Fenyman has done to prove that social scientists aren't doing science except for saying: "I see how they get their information and I can't believe they don't know that they haven't done the work necessary"… hmmm… there's not really too much behind that accusation Mr. Fenyman
A law is just a proposition with no exceptions, or, in other words, a true proposition. Some laws are more informative than others, i.e. they preclude more possible occurrences.
The laws of social sciences tend to be less informative, and many, while true, require an inhuman feat of information gathering to fill the initial conditions. Often, we know laws of how things operate in principle, but such laws cannot be harnessed for practical application, because there is no way of performing the necessary measurements. Usually we just grope in the dark.
Models just ignore this problem by reducing the number of variables, and although they may illustrate laws and principles which are true, one should avoid applying their results to reality. They are like metaphors, and we all know what happens when a metaphor is pushed too far.
Lee Kelly -
Right, I agree with all that (well perhaps not "models just ignore this problem"… I think "models do their best to deal with this problem" is significantly more accurate).
But what in the world does this have to do with whether the social sciences are a science or not? Exactly what laws of biology are there? What about geology? The only sciences that are heavily law-based are physics and chemistry as far as I can tell. And to the extent that biology or geology have laws, they're usually laws of physics or chemistry operating on the molecular level – so they're not really specific to biology and geology.
I suppose my concern is that such an eminent scientist as Fenyman seems to have a very strange understanding of what science is!
I don't actually mean that, but it's close enough. The difference doesn't matter.
A lot of intellectuals like to argue that whatever they're doing, it's science; but it's mostly prestige and authority of science they crave.
Arguing "what science really is" is futile and irrelevant, because it's just a word–a matter of convention.
There are many different methods and goals, and whether or not economics or sociology qualify as "science" is not particularly important, or at least it is not important to me. If they are not science, so what? Nothing changes, and any truth and wisdom to be found there yesterday is still there today.
RE: "I don't actually mean that, but it's close enough. The difference doesn't matter."
I understand – I didn't take your post to be a scientific law
I got the gist
Fantastic video. Looks like he was well ahead of the curve on Taleb. Daniel – Excellent work with the typewriter.
Daniel,
When I stated that models just ignore the problem, I meant that they are typically, and necessarily, insensitive to the wealth of variables which exist in reality.
Modellers are the ones who try to deal with the problem, albeit often wrongly, in my opinion. Rather than deal with the problem by recasting their models as metaphors, and unavoidably inadequate for social engineering purposes, they try and overcome the problem by introducing complexities. Their models are still not adequate, and now they fail as useful metaphors, too.
Seth -
RE: "Fantastic video. Looks like he was well ahead of the curve on Taleb. Daniel – Excellent work with the typewriter."
Was Fenyman really that impressive to you, Seth? "my advantage is that I know a lot of things"… "some people tell you organic food is better for you"… "the problem is there are no laws". What exactly was in there that impressed or convinced you, I'm really very curious? His qualifications for being a science seemed to be: (1.) you have laws, and (2.) you are really thorough about checking your results. It amazes me that that is so impressive to you, Seth. This man is a Nobel laureate. I think it's a little embarassing that that's the way he judges whether something is science.
Lee Kelly
RE: "Arguing "what science really is" is futile and irrelevant, because it's just a word–a matter of convention."
Certainly there are limits to where this conversation can go. But give me a break – there is a well accepted scientific method. There are well accepted conventions of scientific ethics. It's not about "prestige". Are social scientists following the scientific method and achieving reasonable results from it or not? It's a very, very simple question. Simply saying it's for prestige doesn't make it so. Economists formulate theories based on prior knowledge, try to falsify those theories with empirical data, and evaluate the robustness of their results. Fenyman can whine all he wants about whether he thinks that's up to snuff, but if it's not science – please enlighten me as to what it is.
RE: "If they are not science, so what? Nothing changes, and any truth and wisdom to be found there yesterday is still there today."
I don't know philosophy of knowledge or anything, but in this world there is a lot of "truth" that gets proclaimed – and a lot is misleading. The scientific method has done a fantastic job guaranteeing that the "truths" we develop are as real and useful as possible. Making sure that social scientists stick to the scientific method (because clearly not all of them do) I think can make the difference between good information and bad. I don't dwell on it either, but that seems to be worthwhile to me.
Earth to Feynman: there are no "laws" in Darwian biology, either.
Feynman — just ONE MORE physicist who is a very bad philosopher or scientist of science.
Feynman is right if you are talking about Samuelsonial economics. Not so much if you are talking about the science of Adam Smith or Friedrich Hayek.
The "laws" picture of science comes from outside of science — it comes from philosophers of science like John Stuart Mill.
Feynman is give us false philosopher of science's picture of "science — he isn't giving us a true picture of actual science in all of its richness across disciplines.
Perhaps a simpler approach to this question of science vs. scientism is to apple a little Karl Popper. Can you theory be falsified with experiment or observation? If it falls into the "all swans are white" kind of hypothesis, then yes, and therefore, you might be practicing science. If it falls into the "does god exist" kind of hypothesis, than you are probably not practicing science. Those are extremes.
So, on that spectrum, where would one put "government deficit spending can be used to stabilize and re-equilibrate a depressed economy by raising total expenditures back to levels of natural real GDP"? Or better, "is war effective stimulus for the economy?"
It would appear on these questions that the answers one derives from the available data depend more on the prior biases of the one reviewing the data then on any kind of objective review of the evidence.
The counter-examples and refutations in history of Keynesian theory appear numerous and extensive. Does that make keynesianism a pseudo-science or am I suffering confirmation bias? I believe the former, but if I am subject to the latter I would still believe the former.
Daniel,
Some methods are better than others for achieving particular goals. The "scientific method", or whatever passes for it these days, may not be the best method for you.
And that's why I do not care all that much what passes as "science" to everyone else, because I do not think that their methods are congruent with my goals, i.e. to learn the truth. That may seem strange, but there is what scientists say, and there is what scientists do, and one doesn't necessarily have much to do with the other–like politicians, I suppose.
Greg -
RE: "Feynman is right if you are talking about Samuelsonial economics. Not so much if you are talking about the science of Adam Smith or Friedrich Hayek."
Now this is interesting… I appreciate Smith and Hayek both a great deal, but I don't really think of them as scientists per se. I take that back – I suppose they could be thought of as theoretical scientists. But the corpus of their work cetainly isn't traditional science. In this sense both Smith and Hayek have a great deal in common with Samuelson.
Theoretical physicists, theoretical biologists, and theoretical economists are all well and good – but science seems to require some attempt at testing and falsification. If I were to think about economic scientists, I would probably think of empirical economists first.
Interesting on where the idea of "laws" came from in science. I didn't know that. It seems to me that presupposing the existence of "laws" and evaluating something on the basis of whether those imagined laws are discovered is actually anti-scientific!!!
"…and they test theories with data – AND their theories seem to describe the world relatively well. I'm not sure what else Fenyman is looking for."
He was referring to historians, sociologists, political 'scientists' and a raft of others who never, ever test the half-baked notions they suggest as "theories" — often without any model or construct that can be used for even the most cursory measure of accuracy.
Were he alive today Feynman would appreciate behavioral and other recent developments in economics and other fields because they rely on data and can be tested. His work, like that on electrodynamics, was based on models that could be proven with evidence. His meetings with social science folks, like those at SUNY, were marked by a lack of common descriptive language, let alone real data and testable assumptions. Post-modern navel gazing was not for him.
I suppose Hayek and Smith and Samuelson and Keynes are our Einsteins, but Friedman and Heckman and Mincer are our Oppenheimers. I should take back what I said above – it's not that Hayek and Smith aren't scientists… I'm just curious why you highlighted them and opposed them to Samuelson.
Is it because you don't think Samuelson did [theoretical] science, or because you don't like what he said?
John Papola -
RE: "It would appear on these questions that the answers one derives from the available data depend more on the prior biases of the one reviewing the data then on any kind of objective review of the evidence."
Why in the world would you say this? Either deficits help or they don't. GDP and deficits are both measurable. There will be methodological battles over spurious relationships and measurement error and that sort of thing. But these are at base scientific and methodological questions to be answered. You need to sketch out better exactly what obstacle you see to answering these questions with science. I have no idea where you're coming from.
RE: "The counter-examples and refutations in history of Keynesian theory appear numerous and extensive. Does that make keynesianism a pseudo-science or am I suffering confirmation bias? I believe the former, but if I am subject to the latter I would still believe the former."
Yes, this is why they don't teach the General Theory verbatim any more. Some elements of Keynesianism have been shown to be false, and they are no longer accepted by economists. Some have evidence in their favor – including that deficits can help to re-equilibrate a deperessed economy, so they have stayed (albeit we've obviously found out that the multiplier is substantially smaller than what Keynes thought it was). That's science – theories get refined when the evidence comes in.
Greg,
A law expresses a relation between variables. You plug values in and derive propositions about the world. If your law is true, and the values you plug in, i.e. the initial conditions, are also true, then you will get a true result.
In physics, the kind of observations you need to make to gather and test your initial conditions are relatively simple, and less time is spent arguing about it. In economics, the kind of observations you need to make to gather and test your initial conditions are impossible. Variables that you do not even know to look for often skew the results you get, and although this problem still exists for physics, it is more acute in economics.
There are laws, that is, true relations which we may understand in principle, but they offer precious little guidance for economic intervention or engineering.
Assumptions are made about the variables which were never measured, it's just that you do not necessarily realise you are making them.
The Other Eric -
RE: "His meetings with social science folks, like those at SUNY, were marked by a lack of common descriptive language, let alone real data and testable assumptions. Post-modern navel gazing was not for him."
Perhaps he just met with a bad bunch. But "real data and testable assumptions" existed in the social sciences long before Feynman died – indeed, long before he was even born.
Perhaps it was an odd post-modern navel gazer that gave him the wrong impression – I get the impression that his experience with post-modern navel gazers has more to do with what he said in this clip than any objective engagement with the social sciences. And in Fenyman's defense, he very clearly admited "I could be completely wrong".
Well, it's not really as simple a question as you think. Social scientists try to follow something similar to the scientific method, but they can only go so far. They can formulate a falsifiable hypotheses, and try to design an experiment to test the hypothesis. The problem is too many variables – you simply cannot do a controlled experiment. The social sciences depend on analysis of data with many changing variables, many of which are unknown. Even with methods to mitigate the risk, it's all too easy to come to false conclusions as a result.
Lee Kelly -
RE: "Assumptions are made about the variables which were never measured, it's just that you do not necessarily realise you are making them."
I don't know if you have any experience with econometrics, but the entire empirical endeavor turns on what assumptions you make. People are very cognizant of this. This is true of any non-experimental empirical science (it's easier to ignore the unmeasured variable in experiments… indeed, that's why experiments are so great when you can get them!).
Meteorologists, many biologists, most geologists, many physicists have this problem as well. So do economists and sociologists. Psychologists (like many physicists and probably all chemists) are not very constrained by this problem you bring up because they can experiment.
What exactly is your point? We're all very aware of the constraints of non-experimental empirical work. This isn't a new or unheard of constraint, and it hardly prevents anyone from doing science.
The biggest problem with social sciences is (like a lot of things in biology) the subject is trickier to measure. That's a limitation, but it doesn't preclude scientific investigation.
yet another Dave -
1. What in the world do experiments have to do with science?
2. True, social scientists have "many many variables"… so? This is all really disturbing to me. Science is a process and the limitations on the process (like "lost of variables" or "weak measurement") certainly impact the robustness of the results, but what do "lots of variables" have to do with whether or not it's scientific… perhaps I should ask it this way: at what number of variables do we stop considering something to be a science??
3. You say "it's all too easy to come to false conclusions as a result". I agree… when you're calculating what percentage of the galaxy is made up of dark matter "it's all too easy to come to false conclusions" as well. You also can't do experiments and there are many relevant variables that we cannot measure. Nobody accuses the people looking into dark matter of being non-scientists.
So to sum up, I suppose I'm saying I have no idea what your points have to do with whether something is a science or not.
Daniel Kuehn — like Feynman, you picture of "science" comes from the philosophers and the philosophical tradition. It doesn't come from real science.
As I've pointed out in my paper on Hayek's explanatory strategy — economics gives us the same set of explanatory alternatives as does the problem of adaptation in the biological world. go to my Hayek blog and look for the link to my paper on Hayek's explanatory strategy in economics.
Daniel – Yes it was.
Feynman found overlooked and nuanced mistakes by physicists in physics experiments (who also happened to be human), a field you refer to as precise.
I can see where he would be skeptical of the quality of "experimental" designs in social science. No matter the experiment, humans design them.
Lee Kelly — I don't buy your picture of "science" either in Darwinian biology or in economics.
There are no fixed 2 relation causal variables subject to "laws" in these sciences — the explanatory element in economics is entrepreneurial learning in the context of changing relative prices and local conditions and these aren't relations between "variables" in an sense that helps thought, rather than obstruct it.
Greg Ransom -
RE: "Daniel Kuehn — like Feynman, you picture of "science" comes from the philosophers and the philosophical tradition. It doesn't come from real science."
You might want to explain exactly what you mean by this. I do borrow somewhat from Popper, but I'm not a strict Popperian. Form a theory based on prior knowledge – test it (perhaps falsifying a la Popper but this isn't absolutely necessary I supporse) with data (either experimentally or non-experimentally), and evaluate the result. I have no doubt some philosophers of science agree with me on that… but I don't see the difference between this and "real science". Perhaps you could explain where I'm erring.
RE: "As I've pointed out in my paper on Hayek's explanatory strategy — economics gives us the same set of explanatory alternatives as does the problem of adaptation in the biological world."
Yes… this is why I'm fond of Hayek.
RE: "There are no fixed 2 relation causal variables subject to "laws" in these sciences"
Good lord – you sound like dg lesvic now.
Tell me – why is this definition what "science is". Give me a reason why I should believe that this definition is anything more than a regurgitated Mises quote.
Jeeeeeze DK, you're gonna have a heart attack before you're 30. Relax!
You asked a question, saying it was "a very, very simple question." I responded to that, because it's not quite that simple. I did not say social sciences weren't science. I did not say any of the things you spewed on about. You should avoid jumping to conclusions.
Perhaps I could have started with the statement that social sciences suffer from a higher level of uncertainty than physical sciences. Would that have not upset your sensibilities?
yet another Dave -
RE: "Jeeeeeze DK, you're gonna have a heart attack before you're 30. Relax!"
?????
RE: "I did not say social sciences weren't science. I did not say any of the things you spewed on about. You should avoid jumping to conclusions."
Oh I knew that – I was more not sure what it had to do with the issue of whether they were a science or not. Take your experimental point. It seems to me that that's a complete non sequitor. I know you aren't making any clear delineations on whether it's a science or not, I was just confused about the relevance of a few of your statements.
RE: "Would that have not upset your sensibilities?"
My sensibilities are fine – you seem to be taking my response rather harshly, though. Maybe I should blunt it a little more. Certainly there is a great deal more uncertainty in the social sciences – in that I agree, and I hope I haven't been giving the impression I deny that (in fact I think I've said they're less precise). I wasn't trying to challenge you on that.
@Daniel,
"Why in the world would you say this? Either deficits help or they don't. GDP and deficits are both measurable."
Indeed they are. But is measurability what makes something "scientific". I'm not sure that's adequate.
Plus, the time horizon is fungible and causality vs. correlation is hard to disentangle. A keynesian could say "look, Bush's deficit spending created an economic boom and re-equilibrated the economy post-dot bomb". Is that true or false? Well, the boom didn't last, so how you define the timeframe impacts the results. Then the question becomes what caused the bust and was the bust inevitably as the result of the boom, etc, etc.
Was the 1960's an era of genuine prosperity resulting from economic fine-tuning, or was it the boom before the bust of the 70's inflationary depression?
Science seeks to find the laws that dictate the behavior of the natural world in a way that can reliably be used for prediction. Testing predictions is, in fact, a crucial element of real science.
Keynesian and Monetarist macro-economics, on the other hand, appear to extract ex-post equations from analysis of aggregate behavioral data. They are statistics applied to the past, not theories with strong predictive power for the future.
The multiplier is probably the best example of ex-post data. How do the current or past propensity of people on average to spend or save likely to predict their intentions in the future? Can you honestly say that such a metric has any predictive power whatsoever, given that the social conditions that influence these human choices are not likely to be repeated?
"That's science – theories get refined when the evidence comes in."
And what of the broad disagreements that remain in all of these areas? As Russ has pointed out repeatedly, he's not aware of many instances where new research has drawn strong conversion. J K Galbraith or Paul Krugman show no signs of skepticism that real science should help provide.
I do think that there are micro-economic laws, especially in terms of scarcity being a reality and the impacts of supply, demand and relative prices. Macro, on the other hand… not so much.
Of course, I am neither an economist nor a scientist, but simply a geeky fan of both disciplines.
@Daniel,
"Why in the world would you say this? Either deficits help or they don't. GDP and deficits are both measurable."
Indeed they are. But is measurability what makes something "scientific". I'm not sure that's adequate.
Plus, the time horizon is fungible and causality vs. correlation is hard to disentangle. A keynesian could say "look, Bush's deficit spending created an economic boom and re-equilibrated the economy post-dot bomb". Is that true or false? Well, the boom didn't last, so how you define the timeframe impacts the results. Then the question becomes what caused the bust and was the bust inevitably as the result of the boom, etc, etc.
Was the 1960's an era of genuine prosperity resulting from economic fine-tuning, or was it the boom before the bust of the 70's inflationary depression?
Science seeks to find the laws that dictate the behavior of the natural world in a way that can reliably be used for prediction. Testing predictions is, in fact, a crucial element of real science.
Keynesian and Monetarist macro-economics, on the other hand, appear to extract ex-post equations from analysis of aggregate behavioral data. They are statistics applied to the past, not theories with strong predictive power for the future.
The multiplier is probably the best example of ex-post data. How do the current or past propensity of people on average to spend or save likely to predict their intentions in the future? Can you honestly say that such a metric has any predictive power whatsoever, given that the social conditions that influence these human choices are not likely to be repeated?
"That's science – theories get refined when the evidence comes in."
And what of the broad disagreements that remain in all of these areas? As Russ has pointed out repeatedly, he's not aware of many instances where new research has drawn strong conversion. J K Galbraith or Paul Krugman show no signs of skepticism that real science should help provide.
I do think that there are micro-economic laws, especially in terms of scarcity being a reality and the impacts of supply, demand and relative prices. Macro, on the other hand… not so much.
Of course, I am neither an economist nor a scientist, but simply a geeky fan of both disciplines.
Where I do believe that physics informs economics is in the laws of thermodynamics. You can't create matter, only change it. Printing money and deficit spending cannot create new productive capacity. It can only re-distribute it through distortions in relative prices and time compressions where future investments are foregone in favor of current investments plus future debt servicing.
John -
RE: "Indeed they are. But is measurability what makes something "scientific". I'm not sure that's adequate."
Who said it was? My point is you said the answer to your question was based in biases. I'm saying it is measured and tested in very objective ways. Measurement in and of itself isn't sufficient to be a science. Nobody is saying it is.
RE: "Plus, the time horizon is fungible and causality vs. correlation is hard to disentangle."
Of course.
RE: "A keynesian could say "look, Bush's deficit spending created an economic boom and re-equilibrated the economy post-dot bomb". Is that true or false? Well, the boom didn't last, so how you define the timeframe impacts the results. Then the question becomes what caused the bust and was the bust inevitably as the result of the boom, etc, etc."
How should I know if that's true or false? You haven't presented the theory this keynesian is testing, the data he used, his methodology, or his results. If the data and methodology are sound and he found this, it may be tentative evidence, but it sounds like scientific evidence to me. Either way, you really can't make this argument without talking about his theory, data, methods, and results.
RE: "Keynesian and Monetarist macro-economics, on the other hand, appear to extract ex-post equations from analysis of aggregate behavioral data."
I think you have this history backwards. The great theoretical expositions of both Keynesianism and Monetarism were created before they were tested by data. Both were partially falsified, and both have been reworked and retested because they failed a number of empirical tests.
RE: "Can you honestly say that such a metric has any predictive power whatsoever, given that the social conditions that influence these human choices are not likely to be repeated?"
This is a limitation – that social sciences are very very rarely experimental. I'm not sure why you think exact replication of conditions is necessary for science to move forward. LOTS of science doesn't have exact replication. But there are non-experimental empirical methods to approximate replication of conditions. Again – lots of science outside economics relies on these non-experimental methods.
RE: "And what of the broad disagreements that remain in all of these areas?"
Yes, if you're squeemish about broad disagreements, science probably isn't appropriate for you.
RE: "J K Galbraith or Paul Krugman show no signs of skepticism that real science should help provide"
I'm not sure what you mean by this. Krugman got a Nobel prize because his work on intra-industry trade overturned preconceptions he had about international trade. Granted – he is a fairly recalcitrant partisan… but I'm not sure his hatred of Bush et al. means he's not going to be convinced by new empirical resutls. Do you?
RE: "Where I do believe that physics informs economics is in the laws of thermodynamics."
Samuelson agreed heartily with this… to bring your point around to one made by Greg Ransom earlier.
RE: "Printing money and deficit spending cannot create new productive capacity. It can only re-distribute it through distortions in relative prices and time compressions where future investments are foregone in favor of current investments plus future debt servicing."
I generally agree with this "you can't create matter only change it"… printing money DOES cause inflation. But the story isn't as simple as that. One thing that does differentiate economics from physics is that when we deal with humans – when we deal with the social sciences – human perception of reality is as relevant as the reality itself. So yes, printing money causes inflation. But printing money can also create productive capacity because of it's impact on human psychology… maybe… at least that's how the theory goes. Either way, humans are not machines. The thermodynamic analogy works impressively well in most cases, but it is still just an analogy. I think these extra behavioral complications are what makes economics so interesting.
Goodnight everyone!
Greg,
My picture of science? I don't even care anymore. And I doesn't matter how many variables are involved, or whatever you want to call it. My point was just a simple matter of logic.
Sure, and I never said it did.
Printing too much money causes inflation, but all money ultimately is printed or minted or something.
Ideally, money appears as needed to denominate the current value of goods with real value and disappears when goods with real value disappear or do not materialize as expected. Basically, we create currency to extend credit for the purchase of valuable goods and remove currency from circulation if goods of comparable value do not replace depreciating goods.
I ordinarily think of the goods preceding the money, but you do have a point in modernity. Only a few generations ago, if I needed credit to become productive, I didn't therefore need money. On the frontier, when I found arable land, I staked a claim, and I recruited a neighbor to help me clear it. My neighbor helped me knowing that I'd share fruits with him later. If I needed a mule and a plow, I'd borrow them on similar terms.
Nowadays, I need money to buy land, money to hire help clearing the land, money to buy a tractor and gasoline, so I need credit to obtain this money. I could, in principle, ask this credit of landowners, manual laborers, tractor and gasoline salesman. I could barter my future fruits for these current goods, but I wouldn't think of obtaining the goods this way, and others probably wouldn't barter with me this way if I did.
So my need for money really is psychological, reflecting my psychological expectations and my neighbors' psychology as well.
Feynman is exactly correct. I think it's his tone that is throwing people off.
Feynman didn't exactly hold philosophy up as a hard science either. He is just differentiating between hard and soft science.
Look at the vast differences in economic thought. When the hard sciences are split on an issue, that is an exciting time for them. It provides a real opportunity to get to the bottom of the problem.
Many of the social sciences tend to relish divergent opinions, and often display ideological biases. There are isomorphisms everywhere in competing social theories, but often, they are willfully ignored after adopting an ideological stand.
The soft sciences are broadly subjective because they have to be. History is not always accurately recorded, and observation is often tainted by bias.
Some people here are labeled socialists as though there were an objective, clearly delineated thing.
Some economists will tell you with a straight face that lowering taxes will fix economies, as though the government taxes and never spends the money.
Oh, but it's inefficient that way. Really? How much has weather satellites helped efficiency?
Regulations are bad, they add a tax to businesses. Really? Merck can claim the FDA is a royal drag on their company, but their company would have been sued into oblivion if it were not for the FDA.
I think that's what Feynman was getting at. Making judgements of truth based on first-order observation.
He also plays some mean bongos: CLIP
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qWabhnt91Uc
– maybe not so much with the hyperlinking on cafe hayek….
Seems like Mises discussed this in one of his books. "Theory and History," I think.
Physics is an empirical science. Economics is a deductive science.
But I'm with Feynman, I don't know much about the world. So, I could be way wrong.
Wikipedia to the rescue (http://wiki.answers.com/Q/What_is_a_scientific_law)
A scientific law is a law that should be taken to be universally applicable. It attempts to describe an observation in nature and applies to all of the different sciences.
A scientific law is a theory that has been tested and is believed to be true. Laws are usually used in Physics, whereas in Biology and Chemistry, the same definition is used to describe a scientific theory.
Hence,
The law of gravity
The theory of evolution
Both are considered to be true in equal amounts, it's just a difference in terminology.
Hooray, no more arguing about the topic!
But really, I'm with K Ackermann on this part at least…
"He is just differentiating between hard and soft science."
My two cents are that scientific laws are statements that describe a certain event under certain SET circumstances. For instance, the four laws of thermodynamics:
0. Definition of Temperature
1. Conservation of Energy
2. Entropy of a closed system increases
3. Absolute zero entropy (impossibility of absolute zero)
These laws do not say why this occurs, only that these occur. There are no biases associated with these and they are not open for interpretation.
One reason I think Feynman is correct in his interpretation of physical laws is
1. His amazing bongo playing
2. http://search.barnesandnoble.com/The-Character-of-Physical-Law/Richard-Feynman/e/9780262560030
Medicines containing derivatives of salicylic acid, structurally similar to aspirin, have been in medical use since ancient times. Salicylate-rich willow bark extract became recognized for its specific effects on fever, pain and inflammation in the mid-eighteenth century. By the nineteenth century pharmacists were experimenting with and prescribing a variety of chemicals related to salicylic acid, the active component of willow extract. – Wikipedia
Thank nature for producing the Willow tree. The birds and the bees uses the tree for lodging and sustenance The bark was used as we use aspirin today for a variety of ailments such as headaches. Swallowing an electrode or diode will only make you sick.
It is natural for Feynman or anyone to think that what they do is paramount. He didn't strike me as overly arrogant, so it's okay for him to think that what he does has more relevance and is more "real" or tangible than what the other fellow does. Millions of people believe in absurd religious beliefs and kill one another over it. Why do physicists work for the evilest people and most theocratic regimes in the world to make the most destructive nuclear weapons? A physicist without a soul is a piece of garbage. And that is coming from someone who quivers when people mention the human "soul" and deny it to other living things. Moral philosophy is light years ahead of the amoral physicist or evil 3rd world dictator. Physics is not the end all and be all of enlightenment. People cope with gravity without even knowing it exists. Physicists know that it exists and how it works but don't know what's "behind" it. Religions seek to explain the world but tell incredible stories to do so. Science should defeat mythology, but has failed to do so in the minds of the masses. That is why we are on the brink of WWIII. The world is a nightmare for which there is no awakening from or escaping. It's here to stay until it's no longer here. You can quote me on that.
Excellent discussions! There are some brilliant folks in this blog.
My view, there is always a blend of ART and SCIENCE in learning, in business, in life, since conditions do change and powerful forces rule. Navigating the motion in the ocean — waves that forever build, roll, and collapse — is an ART which SCIENCE supports.
Von Mises's _Human Action_ is a pretty compelling explanation about why social "sciences" are as Feynman describes, and what a proper approach to them might look like.
And I agree. Feynman is right. But I'm still enthralled by history and economics.
I don't get it, he's right about what? His example isn't even really social science (unless medicine is a social science…?). What is it he calls social science?
I'm confused by this entry, Russ.
Ok, maybe I get it now, social science was just an example of what he thinks is not real science, and "organic food science" is another example of pseudo-science.
Is this how I should be interpreting this post+video?
Mathieu -
Nah, don't give him that much credit
A lot of people have talked about the biases of the social sciences. What I think is most strikingly obvious about the clip was that this is really just the expression of previously held biases about social sciences. As others have noted as well, his one example isn't even social science. Other than that his argument amounts to "they don't have laws" and "they don't work as hard". I know this was somewhat of a casual statement on his part – fine. But it's not a Nobelesque exposition of science by any stretch of the imagination.
Re: Mises on "Physics is an empirical science. Economics is a deductive science."
It's worth noting that Mises takes the liberty of rejecting all empirical economics, therefore this definition of his is not really a statement about what economics is, but what he thinks economics ought to be. Readers shouldn't confuse that – Mises can't possible claim that empirical work isn't done in economics.
You can do empirical work in astrology or eugenics too. That doesn't make them science.
Another point addressed nicely in _Human Action_. Feynman was talking about scientism.
Surely you're joking, Mr. Feynman!
vikingvista -
RE: "You can do empirical work in astrology or eugenics too. That doesn't make them science."
OK… but you could say this about physics or chemistry too. This critique, to be quite honest, is absolutely meaningless.
You are right to point out that empirical work is only worth while if cause and effect actually have some sort of real causal relationship. Sure – of course.
Do they have a real causal relationship in astrology? No.
Do they have a real causal relationship in economics? That's the question. I think even Mises would have to answer "yes". And if they have some underlying real causal relationship, how is applying the scientific method to understand and quantify that relationship inappropriate?
In other words – you make a true but trivial statement. The question is – why in the world would you assume that economics is analagous to astrology rather than biology?
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