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The Washington Post‘s Editorial Board – which now includes, by the way, a GMU Econ alum – writes insightfully against banning sales of Chinese-assembled automobiles in the U.S. Three slices:

The legislation for the proposed ban gives the game away by allowing companies that have been manufacturing cars in the U.S. for five years to keep doing so. Volvo would qualify. Lawmakers don’t have a problem with Chinese cars per se. They want to ban additional competition.

…..

China’s industrial policy is not a stroke of genius. Its auto subsidies are funded by massive domestic household savings held hostage by government capital controls. The country suffers from high unemployment and underemployment, even as its population declines. China is shedding factory jobs as automation and outsourcing become more widespread there.

Beijing has been rolling back its car subsidies for the past few years, leading to numerous bankruptcies. Top firms such as SAIC, BYD and Geely, however, are globally competitive and will have lots to offer U.S. buyers, even as Chinese citizens are left worse off by their government’s myopic focus on exports.

If Chinese cars were to break through with U.S. customers, Chinese automakers would likely build factories in America. That basic pattern has played out time and again with foreign manufacturers: Honda, Toyota, Nissan, Mazda, Subaru, Kia, Hyundai, Volkswagen, BMW and Mercedes-Benz all make cars for Americans in the U.S. They do so not because the government forces them to, but because it logistically makes the most sense.

The U.S. might believe it can weaken China by denying its automakers access to the U.S. market. But that’s delusional. These Chinese companies are selling in much of the rest of the world, and they’re not going to stop. American consumers are just missing out.

…..

It is not fair to perpetually ask American car buyers to pay higher prices and have fewer options just to protect American automakers. And ignoring the realities of the global market will not help these American companies in the long run, anyway. Banning additional competition from Chinese automakers is a drastic measure that ignores existing ways to ensure national security while lowering prices for American drivers.

Sam Gregg ponders how to put the protectionist genie back into the bottle where it belongs. A slice:

Trade policy, however, is never developed in a politics-free zone. Despite the animus against protectionism presently widespread among Americans, the likelihood of a new president – let alone a fractious House and Senate – embracing unilateralism is low, at best. Even many political leaders who firmly believe in free trade may balk at adopting this approach, not least because it would be all too easily demagogued to death by free trade critics and special interests as selling out American workers to foreigners.

The alternative to unilateralism is multilateral, plurilateral, or bilateral trade agreements. Each has different mechanics and its own pros and cons. Multilateral agreements, such as those negotiated through institutions like the WTO, generally lower trade and non-trade barriers across the global economy. However, they take years (and sometimes decades) to settle on account of the large number of participating nations, not to mention the various business, union, and NGO interests trying to influence the process. Even in a post-Trump world, the WTO’s sheer size, combined with the presence in its ranks of a China committed to neomercantilist policies and with a bad record of violating or ignoring WTO rules, makes successful multilateralism via such structures a long shot.

Bilateral agreements involve only two partners in the agreement and thus are, theoretically, easier to negotiate. But the proliferation of such agreements also creates confusing, mismatched trade rules across the global economy that end up complicating trade for everyone.

That leaves us with plurilateral free trade agreements. Broadly speaking, these involve a set of countries voluntarily agreeing to rules and policies that liberalize specific areas of trade, while leaving the door open for other countries to join the group if they agree to embrace the rules.

A contemporary example is the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). This arose out of the ruins of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was scuttled by the first Trump Administration in January 2017. Among other things, CPTPP has reduced barriers on nearly all goods traded between its one European and 11 Asia-Pacific members and moved toward clearer guidelines for digital trade, investments, and services.

John O. McGinnis writes wisely about data centers.

Vitor Melo documents some of the many amazing things that AI is doing for humanity. Two slices:

Begin with the labor market, where AI’s effect so far has been minimal. In a recent study, my colleagues and I compared the occupations most exposed to AI—software developers, financial clerks, administrative assistants—with those least exposed. Job postings and layoffs showed no statistically significant change across industries regardless of AI exposure.

Other studies confirm our findings: AI adoption has no detectable effect on employment, earnings or hours worked, with exceptions so far confined to some entry-level jobs in the most exposed fields. Employers added 162,000 jobs in August, beating expectations, with unemployment steady at 4.1%. Four years after ChatGPT’s launch, the mass layoffs that everyone feared haven’t shown up in the data.

Now consider what the jobs debate leaves out. In 2024, the Nobel Prize for Chemistry went to three scientists for work on protein structures enabled by AI. Many medications work by binding to the shape of proteins in the body, and for more than half a century, determining that shape could require years of lab work for a single protein. Now an AI platform called AlphaFold predicts it in hours. Its makers in 2022 released the structures of almost all 200 million proteins known to science, and more than three million researchers in 190 countries have used them, a third of them to better understand disease. Years of work that once stood between a patient and a cure could see a breakthrough in an afternoon.

New drugs are already arriving. In 2022 South Korea approved a Covid-19 vaccine built with a computer-designed protein, the first medication of its kind. Last year patients with a fatal lung disease who took a drug designed by generative AI saw their lung function improve in a randomized trial, while patients on a placebo declined. And as some bacteria resist antibiotics, AI has identified a new class that kills drug-resistant staph.

…..

Human flourishing has never been measured in job titles. It is determined in suffering avoided, time returned and problems solved that once seemed intractable. Ask whether AI will take our jobs, and the honest answer is: not yet. But ask whether it is helping people prosper, and the answer is an easy yes.

Steven Greenhut is also an AI optimist.

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On Diesel Donald

Here’s a letter to the Wall Street Journal.

Editor:

Mike Sommers makes excellent arguments against banning diesel exports (“The Diesel Export Ban Folly,” Sept. 25). But he leaves one out. By shrinking the market that U.S. refiners serve, an export ban, which raises the likelihood of future bans, will cause refiners to invest less in capacity over time. Why build to serve the global market for an average of 365 days a year when your market in the future is likely to be global for an average of only, say, 300 days a year?

As capacity shrinks, the real long-run price of diesel and other petroleum products will rise. Even if the ban lowers diesel prices today, the cost of that price cut will be higher energy prices tomorrow and long into the future.

Doubters should consider a parallel. Suppose Sacramento, reacting to rising global wine prices, banned wine exports from California for 90 days. What would this ban do to winemakers’ incentives to plant vineyards and build wineries? Knowing that the government is likely to restrict their market again, winemakers would scale back, and Californians would pay more for wine over the long run.

The same is true of diesel.

Sincerely,
Donald J. Boudreaux
Professor of Economics
and
Martha and Nelson Getchell Chair for the Study of Free Market Capitalism at the Mercatus Center
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA 22030

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Quotation of the Day…

… is from page 88 of David Schmidtz’s chapter “But Is It Just?” in David Schmidtz and Robert E. Goodin’s wonderful 1998 book, Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility: For and Against:

To be sure, what people care about is sensitive to social context, and we should applaud institutions that encourage people to care for each other. But telling people that they are required to tend someone else’s garden rather than their own does not encourage people to care for each other. It does the opposite. It encourages spite.

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Fueling Economic Understanding

Here’s a letter to a Facebook commenter.

Mr. Edinger:

Commenting on my Facebook page, you ridicule me for criticizing Trump’s proposal to ban exports of diesel from the U.S. In your opinion, Trump is a brilliant strategist who understands that “limiting exports of US diesel will ultimately lower domestic prices by increasing our supply, which will ripple through prices for a wide variety of commodities and finished goods since diesel is extensively used in our trucking industry.”

Well.

The price of diesel has risen globally because of the war in Iran. Prohibiting U.S. exports of diesel will only further raise the global price of that fuel. Because the proposed export ban is only 90 days, U.S. oil companies – as Justin Wolfers points out – are not going to sell diesel today at prices in the U.S. lower than they can fetch in 90 days by selling that diesel abroad.

But let’s assume, contrary to fact, that this proposed export ban would indeed cause the price of diesel today in the U.S. to fall below the global market price. By shrinking the size of the market served by U.S.-based oil producers, the export ban – which raises the chances of future export bans – will likely cause these producers to allow the scale of their operations in the U.S. over time to shrink. Why optimize to produce to serve the global market an average of 365 days annually when your market in the future is likely to be the global market an average of only, say, 250 days annually?

As the scale of operations shrinks over time, the real long-run price of diesel (and, by the way, also the real prices of other fuels and products made from petroleum), will rise. At best, the export ban will achieve lower diesel prices today in exchange for higher energy prices tomorrow and long into the future.

If you doubt this analysis, answer me this: Suppose the State of California, in an attempt to lower the prices Californians pay for wine, prohibits the exportation of wine from that state. What effect would this export prohibition have on California winemakers’ incentives to produce wine and invest in additional vineyards and wineries? Do you really not see that shrinking the market available to California winemakers would discourage them from producing more wine and investing in wine production? And do you really not see that such a ban on wine exports would result in Californians paying a higher price of wine over the long run?

What’s true for wine is true for diesel.

Sincerely,
Donald J. Boudreaux
Professor of Economics
and
Martha and Nelson Getchell Chair for the Study of Free Market Capitalism at the Mercatus Center
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA 22030

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A Last Ditch Effort to Make a Market Experiment Succeed

Among the many wonderful features of free markets is what my former Mercatus Center colleague Adam Thierer calls “permissionless innovation.” “Permissionless innovation” is the freedom of people spending their own money and time to experiment with producing new products, and new ways of producing existing products, combined with the freedom of people as buyers (also spending their own money and time) to choose which of these experiments to support and which not to support. Creativity being what it is, the outcomes cannot be predicted.

It’s beautiful, as such innovation is a peaceful means of promoting prosperity for the masses.

So I applaud this market experiment with a, shall we say, unusual kind of leisure spot.

But the experiment is failing. And yet some people – ignorant of the foundation, working, and benefits of free markets – are unjustly criticizing the owners of this experiment for trying to salvage it.

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Some Links

Pete Earle, writing in the Wall Street Journal, tells the tale of Thomas Edison warning about the dangers of alternating-current electricity delivery. A slice:

Thomas Edison published an article in the North American Review in November 1889 with the headline “The Dangers of Electric Lighting.”

New York’s hurried electrification had filled its streets with overhead wires, uneven installation and high-voltage lines that could kill people. Safety had become a concern, and Edison argued that high-tension currents, particularly alternating current, posed an unacceptable danger.

AC also happened to be a threat to Edison’s business. Edison built his system on direct current. His competitor, George Westinghouse, was developing AC, which could transmit electricity economically over much greater distances than Edison’s low-voltage DC. Edison’s system required generating capacity relatively close to customers. AC could be stepped up for transmission and stepped down near where it was used. Amid the safety debate, the economics of electricity generation and distribution were at stake.

Edison favored restrictions that would have made high-voltage AC harder to deploy. His anti-AC publicity campaign worked to convince the public that AC was more deadly than DC. Electrical engineer Harold P. Brown, with assistance from Edison and his company, electrocuted animals using AC in public demonstrations. The use of an AC system for the first electric chair—which Edison actively encouraged—hardly hurt the message. In response to public concern, Westinghouse argued that the risks of his method could be managed through better engineering and safety precautions. He succeeded, and AC became the dominant U.S. electrical standard by the end of the 19th century.

It is easy in retrospect to turn Edison into a rent-seeking villain protecting his investment in DC. The history is less convenient. People really were being killed, and Edison seems to have believed the danger was severe. But the sincerity of his concern says little about the merits of the rules he wanted.

This is where public choice theory earns its keep. Rent-seeking doesn’t require corrupt businessmen scheming with corrupt politicians. Edison could have sincerely feared high-voltage electricity and preferred regulations that impaired Westinghouse. Safety and self-interest didn’t have to compete for space in his head.

The spectacle of artificial-intelligence executives traveling to Washington to warn government about the technology they’re building belongs to the same tradition as the so-called war of the currents.

The Editorial Board of the Washington Post wisely warns against a ban on diesel exports. A slice:

Disrupting the supply chain would risk increasing diesel prices in states with key Senate races, especially Maine and Alaska. The American Action Forum, a right-leaning think tank, notes that due to “pipeline bottlenecks” and insufficient domestic infrastructure, regions like Alaska rely on imports to top up their supplies. New England also “relies heavily on diesel imports” from Canada. Cutting U.S. exports would raise the global market price, which would be passed along to Mainers buying it from America’s northern neighbor.

Government interventions in energy markets never end well. Trump may not be thinking about 2029, but restricting diesel exports would give environmentalists a precedent to justify pushing the next Democratic president to do the same as a means of reducing emissions. Any perceived risk that government will block exports when it becomes politically convenient to do so would discourage capital investment in domestic refining capacity, which is desperately needed to achieve U.S. energy independence.
These are basic economic lessons that the U.S. should not need to learn anew. Trade makes us richer. Tariffs make us poorer. Price controls lead to shortages and, eventually, higher prices. Please, not another lesson.

Also writing insightfully about the infantile proposal to lower diesel prices by banning diesel exports is Eric Boehm.

Steven Greenhut explains what shouldn’t – but, alas, what today nevertheless does – need explaining: “Cutting off trade with Europe would not make America wealthier.” A slice:

Tariffs and other restrictions on trade do not, as Trump said, create a “tremendous good” for Americans. Quite the reverse. Think of all the wonderful benefits we get from open trade—the vast array of fresh fruits and vegetables we can now enjoy in January, the selection of products of every type from every corner of the world.

“The U.S. ran a $197 billion goods deficit with Mexico in 2025, but Mexico also supplies critical vehicles, machinery, electronics and agricultural goods to U.S. businesses and consumers,” explains FreightWaves, a transportation trade publication. If every one of those items had to be manufactured in the United States, it would take years to undo disrupted supply chains and lead to dramatic increases in consumer costs. Haven’t we had enough inflation?

The Financial Times reports this: “”Getting rid of de minimis was intended to clobber Temu, but it’s inflicted collateral damage on many thousands of [US small businesses].” (HT Scott Lincicome)

GMU Econ alum Julia Cartwright, writing in the Washington Post about a new book by James Galbraith, wisely warns against reviving John Kenneth Galbraith’s notion of having prices set by government. A slice:

But the real case for markets rests on a problem he never confronts: local knowledge. Galbraith writes that when profit becomes “the accepted criterion of success,” the result is “pathological.” But prices — and profits — coordinate information about scarcities, technologies and wants, information that no central authority could assemble.

His alternative to markets is a strategic administrative state because “systems need managers.” How the managers are to know what to do raises the classic knowledge and calculation problems associated with economists Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich A. Hayek.

Hayek argued that the information needed to coordinate an economy is dispersed among many people and communicated through prices. His name appears nowhere in this book. Neither does the question of whether or not it is possible to incentivize the managers to achieve Galbraith’s stated economic goals. For a man who opens by declaring his profession a fraud, Galbraith is curiously silent about one of the most important bodies of literature challenging the sort of planning he proposes.

George Will urges the U.S. Supreme Court to undo a wrong wrought by the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. A slice:

The ICWA has repeatedly been implemented not to serve “the best interest of the child” — the national standard regarding non-Indian children — but to serve tribal interests determined solely by the tribes. Hence a 6-year-old girl was taken from her adoptive family — the only family she had ever known — because a great-great-great-great-grandparent was Choctaw.

A California court has said that “children are not dogwood trees, to be uprooted, replanted, then replanted again.” But they often are so treated in obeisance to the ICWA’s race-based binary of “Indian” and “non-Indian” children. The former, subject to tribal jurisdictions less protective than states’ laws, are often more abused, and for longer.

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Quotation of the Day…

… is from page 181 of F.A. Hayek’s 1950 essay “Economics,” written for Chambers’s Encyclopaedia, as this essay is reprinted as chapter 11 in Essays on Liberalism and the Economy (2022), which is volume 18 (expertly edited by the late Paul Lewis), of The Collected Works of F.A. Hayek:

While economics as a theoretical science is necessarily neutral between the ultimate goals of economic policy, there is much that it has to say about the appropriateness of different courses of action once the ends to be achieved are given.

DBx: The economist shares the stated goal of the ‘community activist’ to raise the take-home pay of low-paid workers. The economist, however, opposes – as a means to this end – a government-imposed minimum wage. The economist opposes the minimum wage not because she’s a meany or a baddie, or because she is ‘on the side’ of business rather than ‘on the side’ of labor. None of those accusations is true. The economist opposes the minimum wage because she understands that, while it will raise the pay of some low-paid workers, it will lower the pay of other low-paid workers and otherwise restrict these workers’ employment opportunities.

Disagreeing with someone over means is not disagreement with that someone over ends.

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Mercantilism Is Bananas

Here’s a letter to a long-time friend.

R__:

It’s always good to hear from you.

In response to my letter pointing out that Trump contradicts himself in wishing both to reduce U.S. trade deficits and to ban diesel exports, you write “I don’t agree with Trump’s protectionism any more than you do, but this contradiction theoretically has a simple explanation: he wants people to buy our stuff, except the stuff we need for ourselves.”

Trump would undoubtedly offer such an explanation, but it would fail.

Consider his (bananas) complaint about Americans’ imports of bananas raising U.S. trade deficits: “If we buy $2 billion worth of bananas from Brazil, we’re actually losing $2 billion. So if we stop eating bananas, we actually save $2 billion.” This complaint reveals Trump’s embrace of the mercantilist fallacy that wealth is money rather than access to goods and services that money buys. And so by advocating that we Americans be prevented from exporting diesel, Trump advocates – by his lights – that we Americans be prevented from enriching ourselves with the money we’d earn on exports of diesel.

Trump’s ‘philosophy’ of trade is that we ‘lose’ insofar as we import (because imports are paid for with money) and ‘win’ insofar as we export (because exports bring in money). But because this ‘philosophy’ is absurd, it inevitably races head-long into hard realities that even he must acknowledge – such as that truckers run their rigs on diesel, not dollars.

What your theoretical defense of Trump amounts to is the claim that Trump gets to pick and choose which goods (e.g., diesel) are worth to Americans more than the dollars at which they sell, and which goods (e.g., bananas) are worth to Americans less than the dollars at which they sell. But surely the people in the best position to make these assessments are not politicians and bureaucrats but, rather, ordinary Americans, who are spending their own money.

Subscribers to a political movement that prides itself on refusing to be bullied by arrogant elites should reject such arrogance.

Sincerely,
Donald J. Boudreaux
Professor of Economics
and
Martha and Nelson Getchell Chair for the Study of Free Market Capitalism at the Mercatus Center
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA 22030

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Trump Fuels Economic Ignorance

Here’s a letter to the Wall Street Journal.

Editor:

Reporting on the GOP’s call to ban diesel exports, you quote President Trump: “I’ve said let’s not send out the diesel. We make a lot of diesel” (“Republicans Are Running on Empty,” September 23).

Mr. Trump is deeply confused. He incessantly accuses foreigners of “ripping us off” by buying too few of our exports. Indeed, he asserts that foreigners’ failure to buy as many of our exports as we buy of theirs constitutes a “national emergency” that warrants sweeping tariffs. Yet now he supports banning diesel exports, thereby – according to his own lights – aggravating the very “national emergency” that he insists justifies his tariffs.

Sincerely,
Donald J. Boudreaux
Professor of Economics
and
Martha and Nelson Getchell Chair for the Study of Free Market Capitalism at the Mercatus Center
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA 22030

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Some Links

David Henderson shares a fond memory of the late Sen. John Kyl (R-AZ).

David Bahnsen busts the myth that the MAGA right is filled with principled libertarians.

Wall Street Journal columnist Gerard Baker, I’m sure, speaks for many sensible people. A slice:

I’ve never been a victim of Trump derangement syndrome. Yes, I’ve found much that is repellent in the man’s character and rhetoric. But whatever his shortcomings, it seemed clear to me by 2016 that the country had, through years of bipartisan failure and the transformative effects of a malign cultural revolution, reached a point where radical change was needed. I was open to the idea that jarring disruption of the political order—perhaps necessarily delivered by a jarring figure—might be the only way to reassert the sovereignty of a disenfranchised people, restore the primacy of American interests against globalized progressivism, and reclaim our traditional civilizational values.

Even after Jan. 6, 2021, removed any doubt about the threat Donald Trump might pose to our constitutional norms and rules, I thought the institutions of the U.S. would be strong enough (as they were then) to constrain his worst instincts and intentions. And by November 2024, after four years of a Democratic presidency had revived the prospect of a restoration of the progressive left’s crippling hegemony, the risks he posed seemed smaller than theirs.

But I am sorry to have to report that I have now self-diagnosed with a virulent form of TDS. Not one malady but three: as my condition has steadily progressed over the last year from Trump disappointment syndrome through Trump disillusionment syndrome to a full-blown case of Trump dismay syndrome.

Dismay seems to me the only natural response to the way the Republican Party has blown one of the great opportunities in political history in less than the time it takes to graduate from community college. When Mr. Trump won in 2024, becoming only the second Republican since 1988 to receive a plurality of the popular vote, he had a real chance to establish a new governing order, perhaps even to break the generation-long deadlock in partisanship.

He didn’t have to do anything especially risky. The opportunity was to use his victory—and a Republican Congress—to do things that would command significant majorities among Americans: take control of the border, alleviate the pressure on working Americans from rising prices, roll back the woke authoritarian takeover of governing and cultural institutions, and keep the U.S. military out of costly, ineffective foreign interventions so we could focus on confronting with our broad network of allies the great strategic threats of the next 20 years.

How’m I doin’? as another controversial, larger than life New Yorker used to ask.

Thanks to a self-indulgent tariff fixation based on a profound misunderstanding of international economics, an insouciance about public finances that has widened the deficit, and a reckless military adventure that has choked off global energy supplies, inflation and interest rates are higher than they were in November 2024. Instead of a hands-off approach to the economy that would have generated noninflationary growth owing to the AI investment boom, we now have gasoline prices 30% higher than they were two years ago, diesel 60% higher, and the average mortgage rate nearly a percentage point higher, adding more than $2,000 a year to a typical home buyer’s interest cost.

The war that has done so much harm to Americans’ finances is doing far more harm to our military capacity and our strategic interests. The president has alienated everyone in the world who could be helpful to us (perhaps excepting Israel) and emboldened and even embraced every country in the world that threatens us: China, Russia, North Korea.

A signal achievement has been getting control of the border and removing some of the people who have no legal right to be here. But even with this proper and overwhelmingly popular policy, the administration has managed to harm the country and the GOP’s standing. The unnecessarily cruel and indiscriminate approach has caught many in its dragnet who shouldn’t be treated that way and is fundamentally un-American. The political effect has been to devastate support for the GOP among Hispanics, more than reversing the gains Mr. Trump had made with the fastest-growing ethnic population in the country.

Further dismaying is the caesarism of the past two years: the grotesque self-enrichment, the self-satisfying prosecutorial pursuit of political enemies, the endless projects of self-grandiosity—the ballroom, the Kennedy Center and the Memorial Arch. Not to mention the buffoonish symbolic acts that substitute for actual thought and policy: the Gulf of America, Lake America, New America, the 51st state.

When presidencies fail, when political parties’ fortunes collapse, it’s often the result of circumstances and decisions beyond their control: an unforeseen global crisis, a recession caused by exogenous economic forces, the sentiment that it’s time for a change after a relatively successful period in office.

None of that applies to the looming Republican calamity. Instead, it will be the result of presidential hubris, vanity, recklessness and the wider party’s abdication of accountability. Instead of seizing an unrivaled opportunity to shift America off the path of progressive endangerment, the GOP risks handing it back to the Democrats and their own obsessions.

The Editorial Board of the Wall Street Journal is correct about today’s GOP: “The party’s panicky rush to ban diesel exports reveals their electoral trouble.” A slice:

A diesel self-embargo is a bad idea for many of the same reason Republicans criticized Joe Biden’s “pause” on new liquefied natural gas exports. The U.S. is the world’s largest exporter of diesel, selling about 1.5 million barrels abroad a day, mostly from the Gulf Coast. Proponents of a ban say this would increase U.S. supply and thus push down prices.

But there’s not enough pipeline capacity to move the diesel in the Gulf Coast that is normally exported to the Northeast and California, or for that matter to significantly boost flows to the Midwest. A ban on exports would increase global diesel prices, which would smack Americans living in coastal areas that rely on imports.

Diesel would pile up in Gulf Coast storage, prompting refineries to reduce run rates. That would lower the production of gasoline and jet fuel, whose prices would rise. Limiting exports would also signal the U.S. is an unreliable trade partner and might prompt allies to diversify diesel supply, perhaps by buying more from China. If Democrats win the White House in 2028, they’ll use GOP support for a diesel export ban to justify reinstating the Biden LNG embargo.

Americans are feeling the squeeze of higher fuel prices, and the pain is especially acute for farmers who use diesel to power equipment. Diesel prices have surged amid supply disruptions from the Iran war, and Russia’s new ban on diesel exports.

But if Republicans want to reduce diesel prices fast, they’d suspend or scrap the renewable fuel standard (aka ethanol mandate). The biofuel blending requirements add between 30 and 40 cents to every gallon of diesel. Refineries have to blend increasing amounts of biofuels into products or buy regulatory credits to comply with quotas.

The Editorial Board of the Washington Post decries the arrogance and economic ignorance of Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-MA). A slice:

Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Massachusetts) doesn’t think food from some restaurant chains tastes as good as it used to. To address that, she wants to restrict the rights of private equity firms to buy restaurant chains. The senator is forgetting the check that already exists: consumer sovereignty.

Jacob Sullum rightly explains that “Trump’s banishment of disfavored news outlets reflects his contempt for freedom of the press.”

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