Johan Norberg, using the example of his native Sweden, warns Americans of the dangers of MAGA-DSA socialism. A slice:
Sweden established the Swedish Investment Bank in 1967 to channel long-term finance to industry and in 1970 it founded the state holding company Statsföretag (Swedish State Company), which brought 22 companies under a single umbrella to coordinate and expand government ownership.
Soon, what first seemed like a strength—that state ownership could achieve many goals simultaneously—became a corporate governance nightmare. Boards and management fought over whether profitability or industrial policy should take precedence, making both strategic decisions and accountability difficult.
State ownership also turned government into both umpire and player: the same politicians who regulated industries and distributed subsidies now had a financial interest in the success of particular companies.
Some companies used government resources and guarantees for activities that seem distant from core state responsibilities. A state-owned restaurant group sent two employees to work for McDonald’s in the United States on a fact-finding mission. Armed with this know-how, they later started Clock, a rare example of a government-run hamburger chain, including the distinctly Swedish “Hawaii burger,” topped with pineapple.
At one point, the Swedish Investment Bank led a consortium trying to salvage the Spanish galleon San José, which had sunk off the Colombian coast in 1708 with a treasure of gold believed to be worth billions. The consortium fell apart, and the San José remains on the ocean floor.
Industrial policy gradually became an ad hoc system for rescuing failing companies. Instead of creating new industries, the government increasingly bailed out shipyards, steel companies and textile firms under pressure from trade unions and local politicians. The rescue operation became known as the “Industrial Emergency Room.”
Between 1976 and 1982, the Statsföretag group accumulated total losses of around $2 billion in today’s money, a huge sum for a small economy. Shipyard bailouts had cost the equivalent of $17 billion.
Kjell-Olof Feldt, minister of finance in the Social Democratic government that took over in 1982, described state-owned companies as “a black hole” in the public finances. A spokesman for the biggest center-right party observed: “State ownership of business has, with few exceptions, been a gigantic failure.”
Assar Lindbeck, the Social Democratic economist who first proposed creating the investment bank, came to regret his advice, noting, “I have never heard any informed observer argue that the Investment Bank served any useful purpose during its existence.”
Remarkably, less than 15 years after the new policy had been launched, a consensus had emerged that it had been a costly failure. In the 1980s and 1990s, loss-making companies were closed down and many state-owned companies were sold. One study showed that productivity in companies increased after privatization by between 12 and 36 percent.
GMU Econ alum Dave Hebert reflects on the 2026 Nobel laureates in economics. A slice:
The last implication of this year’s prize that I’ll go over is that credibility matters. A government that announces that they’re going to do something in the future affects people’s behavior today. The government then faces a choice: they can do that thing, in which case it will show that they are credible but it will have very little macroeconomic effect, or they can do something different, which will produce a short-run jolt but will strain their credibility going forward.
Few areas of policy illustrate this better than trade over the last two years. Since January of 2025, tariffs have been announced, threatened, paused, raised, delayed, and cut at a pace that can only be described as “frantic.” As a result, America’s credibility has been strained on the world stage, making it harder to secure any form of trade deal. When people do not believe what the government is saying, that uncertainty itself has a deterrent effect on economic activity. If there is one thing that we have learned, it’s that long-term growth requires long-term plans and long-term plans require credibility.
Mani Basharzad and Bryan Cheang tell “what this year’s Nobel Prize in Economics should teach policymakers about the limits of their power.”
Alan Charles Raul ponders the fraying of the rule of law in the United States. A slice:
The rule of law has mostly held. In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court declared that in “a government of laws, and not of men,” it is “emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” In Youngstown, the Court stopped President Harry Truman from seizing the steel mills, even in wartime and notwithstanding the national security context. Justice Robert Jackson’s concurrence anticipated precisely the present weakness in our constitutional governance where a president would dispense with the constraints of law and separated powers: “Congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence,” Jackson wrote, would “enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility.” Jackson’s essential lesson was that history has discovered “no technique for long preserving free government except that the Executive be under the law.”
America now confronts a challenge to that technique. In Donald Trump, we have a president who will not agree to be governed by quaint theories of checks and balances, at least so long as Congress can fairly be described as inert, indifferent, and quiescent. Madison believed that an ongoing contest of wills between ambitious legislators and chief executives would keep arbitrary power in check: “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.” He would be astonished by today’s legislative capitulation.
But the Convention also framed the presidency with George Washington before its eyes — a president who pledged to a foundation for government predicated on “the pure and immutable principles of private morality,” by which he meant virtue, honesty, and respect for what the Declaration invoked as the “Laws of Nature and Nature’s God.” Our Framers never could have expected a president to profess to be restrained “only by my own morality,” rather than by law and fiduciary duty to the public. That is not the hallmark of a constitutional presidency; it is instead a Prince’s creed.
On the legal front, the current-day news is mixed. On emergency tariff powers, the Supreme Court deferred to Congress and reined in the president. On birthright citizenship, the justices sided with the plain words of the Fourteenth Amendment over the president’s intransigent ones. And in the Census and Federal Reserve cases, the chief justice called out presidential “pretexts,” reminding judges that they are “not required to exhibit a naivete from which ordinary citizens are free.” Put less euphemistically, this means that many judges, and some justices, believe the present government is routinely lying to them.
Overall, though, the Court has catered to untrammeled presidential power by summarily reversing scores of lower-court rulings on its “shadow” docket, often without explanation. But the unmitigated apogee of undue deference to the presidency came in Trump v. United States. There, the Court’s majority invented a nearly absolute presidential immunity from federal criminal law and did so in a case concerning the efforts of a president qua candidate to overturn an election by hook or by crook. Unless we can find a way to fix this, America can no longer claim that no man is above the law.
Citing a Financial Times report, Doug Irwin tweets: (HT Scott Lincicome)
Some people thought protectionism would be a political winner. 🤔
Republicans turn on Donald Trump’s tariffs in battle for ‘political survival’