Bob Poole remembers Manny Klausner.
Also remembering Manny Klausner is Brian Doherty. A slice:
On returning to America, he taught at the University of Chicago Law School in 1964–65, where he also did editing work for the early libertarian student magazine New Individualist Review and The Journal of Law and Economics. “Chicago was an exciting place to be because of the quality of faculty, the intellectual atmosphere, and a serious tradition of liberty among people there,” Klausner said in that 1999 interview. “It turned out to be an extraordinary experience for me to be part of that community of scholars and the rich intellectual tradition at Chicago, both law and economics and philosophy and history—there were many great scholars there who take liberty seriously.” He credited Aaron Director and Ronald Coase as particularly rich influences in his Chicago time.
The Editorial Board of the Wall Street Journal rightly decries the politicization – which is to say, the destruction – of law:
Democrats in the Biden years tried to politicize the judiciary, even proposing legislation to pack the Supreme Court. Now Republicans are getting into this disreputable racket, calling for the impeachment of judges who rule against President Trump. On Tuesday Chief Justice John Roberts rightly rejected such calls.
Paul Sracic explains that the president cannot cut tariff rates without a renewed Congressional delegation of power. A slice:
President Trump’s vision for reciprocal trade hinges on a simple-sounding idea: The U.S. should mirror the trade policies of other nations to level the playing field. But there’s a fundamental issue to implementing it that goes beyond the challenges of determining fair, country-by-country parity for trade restrictions.
When Mr. Trump signed the memorandum to establish the rapid review process for reciprocal tariffs, he said, “On trade, I have decided for purposes of fairness, that I will charge a reciprocal tariff—meaning whatever countries charge the United States of America, we will charge them. No more, no less.”
That “no more” presents a legal problem. As the Cato Institute’s Scott Lincicome points out, there are many instances in which other countries’ tariffs are lower than America’s. But if Mr. Trump truly wants to impose tariffs no higher than other nations’, he doesn’t have the authority to do so on his own.
GMU Econ alum Holly Jean Soto busts “the never-ending myth of the ‘rich getting richer’.”
George Selgin warns of governments’ involvement in cryptocurrencies. A slice:
Of course, champions of a Strategic Bitcoin Reserve don’t say that its only purpose is gratifying the bitcoin lobby. The White House says its plan is aimed at “positioning the United States as a leader among nations in government digital asset strategy.” Others say that a bitcoin reserve will help the government pay down its debt. Still others believe that a bitcoin reserve will directly strengthen the dollar.
The list of justifications for a government bitcoin stockpile is long, not because there are many good ones, but because there are none, so the schemes’ apologists must keep trying. Just what “digital asset strategy” the Trump administration has in mind, apart from pleasing bitcoin enthusiasts, is anybody’s guess. The other justifications are less vague, but no less inadequate.
Take the BITCOIN Act’s claim that a bitcoin stockpile will help the government pay off its debt. For that to be true, two things have to happen. First, bitcoin’s value must go up — a lot. For example, at today’s interest rates, the plan’s million-coin stash would have to more than double in value during its 20-year holding period just to compensate for the plan’s implicit interest cost. Second, the stockpile must eventually be sold to realize the gains, and you can bet that the same bitcoin holders who have managed to get the government to keep the bitcoin it already has will cry foul if it ever tries to sell any new coins it acquires.
The claim that an official bitcoin hoard will strengthen the dollar is just as dubious. It assumes, first, that a bitcoin hoard will serve the same purpose as the 8,133 metric tons of gold mostly kept at Fort Knox, and second, that all that gold is itself propping up the dollar. Even granting the first assumption, the second is false: Gold hasn’t propped up the dollar since Richard Nixon ended the gold standard in August 1971. Were the government serious about paying down its debt, it could do it easily enough just by selling some or all of that no longer necessary gold, instead of creating other useless stockpiles. And the dollar would be none the worse (and probably better) for it.
GMU Econ alum Dominic Pino reports on the connection between easy money and DEI and ESG. A slice:
Interest rates in the 2010s were held down by central banks around the world. An interest rate is the price of money, so a 0 percent interest rate basically means money is free. It was free, or nearly free, for the better part of the past 15 years.
Now, interest rates are at a more normal level. The near-zero rates were a historical aberration — the 4,000-year low point in interest rates, according to interest-rate historian Jim Grant — engineered by central banks conducting trillions of dollars worth of open-market operations.
Interest rates are a reflection of the simple fact that people would rather have a dollar today than a dollar a year from now, so you need to charge something to make up the difference. Holding interest rates at zero is essentially denying that fact. As usual, denying facts creates problems, and they often show up in unexpected places.
As [Russ] Greene puts it: “When money is free, crazy ideas get funded. When money has a price, funders and investors want to see a direct link to value. That means ideological pet projects are the first to go.”
As a result of more responsible central-bank policy — and I stress that is a relative term — many companies are less able to afford to indulge progressive activists’ demands. When money stops being free, you have to start making money. The retreat from DEI and ESG is a resurgence in capitalism, spurred by the conclusion of absurdly easy monetary policy.
According to Sam Kazman, “a bedrock document of climate alarmism may soon be cracked, and it’s about time.” A slice:
In 2021 Steven Koonin, a highly credentialed physicist, former provost of Caltech and former undersecretary of science at the Department of Energy under Obama, published “Unsettled: What Climate Science Tells Us, What It Doesn’t, and Why It Matters,” a detailed critique of climate alarmism and the politics behind its ascendency. It received an overwhelmingly harsh reception from climate activists and the popular press, with little attention paid to its detailed technical content. As one examination of Koonin’s treatment noted about his critics’ failure to deal with his scientific arguments, “[W]hy engage with a heretic when he can be banished from the church altogether?”
Bob Graboyes asks: Who are these historical figures in modern garb?