A question for Andrew Lo

by Russ Roberts on December 3, 2009

in Financial Markets

He says in an interview:

Q: In one article, you compare a disaster that befell a mountain climbing expedition on Mt. Hood to what has happened in the financial system. Could you explain that?
That was a situation where some very experienced climbers made what many considered a rookie mistake. And the reason was because their perception of risk was actually quite a bit lower than the reality. We all have mental models of the world — all of us, except perhaps a few fortunate Zen masters. In many cases, those mental models are misleading. Some of us think of ourselves as better athletes than we are, or as more attractive than we may be. It’s important to bring these models into agreement with reality when discrepancies can actually hurt us. Ultimately we do that through the forces of natural selection. We learn by trial and error. In the case of the mountain climbers, unfortunately, the error was extraordinarily costly in terms of taking their lives.

Q: And you see a similar dynamic in the build-up to the financial crisis.
Absolutely. The example of the mountain climbers is so instructive. Many people are now asking, “How could it be that some of the most sophisticated financial institutions in the world ended up making what now, in retrospect, seem like rookie mistakes, such as taking on too much leverage?” But the fact is, when you’re building a business and the perceived risks have declined because of years of success and prosperity, well, you become complacent about some of those risks in the same way that these very experienced mountain climbers figured this was not a very challenging mountain. It was that false sense of security and perceived lack of risk that led to their demise.

I think this is the common view of the crisis. A mixture of hubris, overconfidence, ignorance, and myopia.

There is one problem with it. The people who allegedly made those rookie mistakes made enormous amounts of money. My questions: is it a mistake if the result is making an enormous amount of money?

My view is that they weren’t making a mistake. They did precisely what the incentives told them to do–take lots of risks with borrowed money. In the worse case scenario, you’ll get fabulously rich–the execs at Lehman and Bear. In the best case scenario, you get even more money than that–the execs at Goldman and JP Morgan. So how what do mistakes have to do with the crisis?

The taxpayers ended up paying the price, not the risk-takers. Our mistake was not paying attention. But we usually don’t. We don’t have time or much of an incentive. But now that we see how it worked, we can tell the politicians to stop creating the bad incentives. They may not listen. But if people recognize the problem (rather than blaming it on human nature), we have a chance.

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  • Guest
    The mountain climber analogy can still hold, just apply it to the policymakers who perceive themselves as able to control through regulation, when the reality was very different. They also made the rookie mistake of assuming their regulatory manipulations would not change the incentive structure for these firms. It is important to remember that government actors were just as myopic about risk as everyone else, as they insisted that Fannie and Freddy were in no danger, despite numerous warnings.
  • SheetWise
    "Ultimately we do that through the forces of natural selection. We learn by trial and error."

    I don't know if you use gaming history as a part of your course study, but I think you should. "The Gambler" by Dostoevsky would be a good place to start.

    Numbers are very misunderstood, even by mathematicians. Their use in economics is particularly disturbing.

    A simple martingale progression, with a proper bankroll, can easily deliver winning sessions 63 out of 64 times. If your goal is to retire in five years, you can easily roll the bones several times a year (and hope for the best). If you use a reapportionment strategy, and trade multiple accounts, you can shoot darts to determine trades and still have a high probability of sustained success before the ultimate failure.

    So, I'm amused by this comment.

    Words have meaning. Read these words again.

    "Ultimately we do that through the forces of natural selection. We learn by trial and error."
  • piefarmer
    Russ,
    I don't see the options as so cut and dry. It is true that even the worst case scenario, they stood to make large amounts of money. But in the moment, none of them wanted it to end. There may not have been much downside risk, but there was the lost opportunity of maximizing their income. So there remains in my mind some question as to why these smart folks did not act in a way to keep the ball rolling.
    My answer is that they thought they had it figured out, but they under-estimated the (delayed) impact of the Fed's rate hike campaign from 2004-2006.
  • Methinks1776
    Good point. I would add that they had a lot of pressure from shareholders to keep it going. If they didn't, they would have been replaced by someone who was willing.

    Russ thinks shareholders are irrelevant. I disagree. The top brass is paid in large amounts of company stock and options. For that to be worth anything, stock investors have to keep piling in. If they stopped, that would have been the signal that investors are unhappy with performance. Shareholders signal to the CEO.
  • russroberts
    I don't think shareholders are irrelevant. But their incentives are very different from bondholders and creditors. And executives who own stock have different incentives than other shareholders. Longer version coming soon.
  • Methinks1776
    Sorry, Russ. I was referring to a response from you on an earlier thread. Perhaps I misunderstood. I'm looking forward to the longer version.
  • HaywoodU
    I would simply say they probably kept it going longer than one knows and the market finally caught up to them. The practices were not sustainable.
  • sandre
    Former Goldman CEO, David Blood, is a business partner of Al Gore. Shouldn't they call their enterprise "Blood & Gore Inc"?
  • "is it a mistake if the result is making an enormous amount of money?"

    That is a GREAT question. When I read it, it triggered a memory of Gary Schilling and Don Luskin on Kudlow & Company a couple years back. Schilling said something like, "These guys booked profits that haven't happened yet." Luskin (who I normally admire) didn't get it. I believe he defended the mark-to-market accounting.

    I think Schilling was spot on. Marking-to-market allowed companies to book profits that hadn't happened. The execs got paid with real money from shareholders pockets and then the truth about the future profits came to light.
  • Methinks1776
    Seth,

    The flips side is that they are also forced to mark to market losses that haven't been realized yet.

    If you are running a fixed income book where the duration of the assets is multiple decades, how do you plan to pay your traders if you don't mark the book and pay on the unrealized profit? I don't have a single employee who can wait 15 years to pay their rent. Usually, the book is marked with a lot of wiggle room so that there is a higher probability of underpaying rather than overpaying the traders and then when the trades matured (the profit/loss was realized) the additional bonus owed to the trader is paid.

    Sure, there's a downside to paying people on unrealized profits, but you don't really have a choice when trading long maturities.

    I think the bigger problem with mark to market is when it's used for very complicated and illiquid instruments. It's possible for counterparties to the trade to make different assumptions and both book a gain when such a thing is impossible. Of course, mark to make believe is even worse and there is no better way to deal with these assets than mark to market.
  • mikeikon
    Question: If the government hadn't bailed them out, would they or would they not still have ended up with enormous amounts of money?
  • Kevin
    Very few if any of the risk-takers experienced increases in their net worth as a result of the bailouts. Many would have lost more absent bailouts, some would probably have lost all absent bailouts. But nearly all of the "risk-takers" who ended up with enormous amounts of money after the bailouts had even more enormous amounts of money in early 2008, including executives at GS and JPM (although those 2 companies have recovered to about where they were).

    I don't like Russ' construction because it conflates the moral hazard of bailouts with the moral hazard inherent in most business forms. Nearly every publicly traded company in America has employees who take risks with borrowed money. Debt is always an option written to equity, and every owner should know the limits of what "fiduciary" can mean in theory and in the real world. These are all real agency costs concentrated in "risk-takers" throughout the economy, bailouts or not. The bailouts transferred a lot of money to creditors, materially less money to shareholders, and a small fraction of that to "risk-takers". What Russ is talking about represents a portion of the banks' agency costs far in excess of what the bailouts contributed.
  • Methinks1776
    Incidentally, these banks employ thousands of people who have no control over what businesses these banks get into or how much risk they take. Those decisions are made by a handful of people and everyone else either carries out the orders or quits.
  • Methinks1776
    They would have had a lot less because they were heavily invested in the firms they were running.

    But, they still would have had a lot of money left. This one trade - housing - was not the only trade they did in their life. Most of these people have had long and successful careers. That doesn't excuse them and it doesn't change incentives and it doesn't mean they didn't make a decision with a disastrous outcome, but it's easy to lose sight of the fact that this one housing bet was not their only career bet.
  • Kevin
    They would have had a lot less because they were heavily invested in the firms they were running.

    I'd quibble with "a lot". The Bear execs got $10 for shares that had been $170. GS traded down 80%. C traded down 95%. Etc.
  • Methinks1776
    That seems like a lot less to me. You don't think so? Still, none of these CEOs were spring chickens and I don't think the net worth of any of them dropped below $100MM. Long careers of making money for people usually leads to a few shillings in the bank.
  • Kevin
    I think when it comes to gaining or losing personal wealth, "a lot" is a concept that only the person experiencing the change can define. I speculate that Pandit wouldn't consider the difference between 1 and 0 to be "a lot." I doubt the Bear people thought the difference between 2 and 10 was "a lot". I could be wrong, and I said it was a quibble.
  • JohnK
    No risk, no caution.
  • Bob in SeaTac
    This is the winner. If there is no cost to the downside, then always take the risk for the faboulous rewards if you hit the upside.
  • Methinks1776
    Russ, I agree with you.

    However, I've now come to the conclusion that it doesn't matter if "we" pay attention or not. "We" can't do anything about it anyway. Look at how much attention "we" paid to health care - they're still going to ram it through.

    "We" all strongly disapproved of the bailouts. "We" were forced to pay for them anyway.

    Also, too many people don't understand how the financial system works and what kind of incentives laws and regulations create. Even those of us who spent our careers in the industry really only know our small section of it. I think it's too much to ask each individual to become expert enough about the industry to keep lawmakers and regulators in check. It has the same pay-off profile as becoming an educated voter. And this, I think, is why elected official think they have carte blanche. They, in fact, do.
  • MnM
    I would also point out that most people were also opposed to the bailouts, and they also rammed that through.
  • ArrowSmith
    "They", the politicians don't have to listen to the little people any longer. The coup is complete.
  • Martin
    The expedition analogy can still hold, though. Far too many people set off into the wilderness or up their favorite mountain with inadequate preparation and equipment. They simply take a GPS tracking device and, if it all goes wrong, press the "911" button and wait for a helicopter to come rescue them. They don't expect to have to pay the tab for the helicopter, either.
  • MnM
    Hear hear. "Incentives matter" can't be said enough.
  • Great, great, great commentary. I know you've done it before, but it would still be helpful if you'd do it again, along with this, that is, explain just how they got their hands on "the borrowed money."
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