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How About a National-Security Exception to the National-Security Exception?

Here’s a letter to National Review Online.

Editor:

Writing about the U.S. Mexico Canada Agreement (USMCA) on trade, Ed Fast correctly notes that “the Trump administration’s renewed use of Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act — claiming “national security” to justify punitive tariffs on Canadian steel, aluminum, and, more recently, copper — reveals the core weakness of the current deal. These tariffs are not about national security. They are protectionism dressed up as patriotism” (“A Trade Deal Without Teeth Isn’t Worth the Paper It’s Printed On,” October 17).

It’s commonplace, even among free traders, to recognize a narrow national-security exception to the case for free trade. Under this exception, protecting particular industries is justified if free trade for those industries is likely to significantly jeopardize national security. What’s not commonplace, but also should be, is the recognition that abuse of the national-security exception to the case for free trade undermines not only free trade but also national security itself.

Protectionism falsely justified in the name of national security makes the nation poorer and less innovative and, hence, less able over time to produce goods and services useful for national defense. In addition, such protectionism angers allies. The resulting international distrust weakens national security by making diplomatic and military alliances more fragile.

There should be a national-security exception to the use of the national-security exception.

Sincerely,
Donald J. Boudreaux
Professor of Economics
and
Martha and Nelson Getchell Chair for the Study of Free Market Capitalism at the Mercatus Center
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA 22030