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Quotation of the Day…

is especially relevant today because the U.S. dollar has been ‘floating’ now for 53 years – that is, the U.S. dollar’s value isn’t pegged or ‘fixed’ to the values of other currencies, to any precious metal, or to any basket of commodities; specifically, this quotation is from pages 15-16 of Milton Friedman’s 1967 “First Lecture” in a debate that he had with Robert Roosa, the proceedings of which are published under the title The Balance of Payments: Free versus Fixed Exchange Rates:

A system of floating exchange rates completely eliminates the balance-of-payments problem – just as in a free market there cannot be a surplus or a shortage in the sense of eager sellers unable to find buyers or eager buyers unable to find sellers. The price may fluctuate but there cannot be a deficit or a surplus threatening an exchange crisis. Floating exchange rates would put an end to the grave problems requiring repeated meetings of secretaries of the Treasury and governors of central banks to try to draw up sweeping reforms. It would put an end to the occasional crisis producing frantic scurrying of high governmental officials from capital to capital, midnight phone calls among the great central banks lining up emergency loans to support one or another currency.

DBx: I thank Phil Magness for reminding me of this piece by Friedman, which I’d first read as an NYU student in 1981 at the suggestion of Professor Fritz Machlup. Until Phil, at his Facebook page, quoted from this piece, I’d forgotten about it.

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Another Open Letter to Scott Bessent

Scott Bessent, Secretary
U.S. Department of the Treasury
Washington, DC

Mr. Bessent:

Today on CNN you said that “the administration remains undeterred” at “getting rid of these massive trade imbalances” (“Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent: Tariff revenue projections ‘unchanged’ after SCOTUS ruling,” February 22).

What trade imbalances? U.S. trade deficits are balanced by U.S. capital-account surpluses. When exporting, importing, and foreign investing are all taken into account – as economics demands – there are no imbalances.

In short, every dollar that foreigners don’t spend buying American exports is a dollar invested, one way or another, in America.

Some of these invested dollars return to the U.S. as foreign direct investment. Is the administration undeterred in efforts to stop such investment? If so, why? Do you think that foreigners’ eagerness to invest in America is evidence that America is ‘losing’ – or being cheated – at trade? And why does the president brag about all the commitments that he allegedly extracts from foreign companies to establish or expand operations in the U.S. – investments that would increase foreign direct investment in the U.S. and, along with it, U.S. trade deficits? Has Mr. Trump changed his mind about these investments?

Some of these invested dollars return as purchases of shares of American companies, thus increasing the ability of these companies to expand and innovate as they also raise the value of Americans’ pension funds. Is the White House undeterred at obstructing American companies’ access to foreign financing and reducing the value of Americans’ savings?

Some of these invested dollars return as purchases of U.S. Treasuries, thus preventing the U.S. government’s fiscal incontinence from pushing interest rates to heights those rates would reach absent these inflows of dollars from abroad. Are you and your colleagues undeterred in your efforts to jack up interest rates by preventing foreigners from lending dollars to the government?

Some of these dollars circulate globally as the global reserve currency, thus allowing us Americans the enormous advantage of buying foreign-made goods, or investing abroad, for the price of printing (or, even better, digitally creating) dollars. Is the administration undeterred at stripping us Americans of this advantage? If so, can you tell us when Mr. Trump changed his mind about wanting the dollar to remain the global reserve currency? After all, if the administration is determined to ensure that the dollar remains the global reserve currency it simply cannot, as a practical matter, also be undeterred at “getting rid” of what you misleadingly call “massive trade imbalances.”

Sincerely,
Donald J. Boudreaux
Professor of Economics
and
Martha and Nelson Getchell Chair for the Study of Free Market Capitalism at the Mercatus Center
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA 22030

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Some Links

GMU Econ alum Dominic Pino – now a columnist at the Washington Post – reports the happy news that, despite Joe Biden’s boast to the contrary, the Biden administration did not, in fact, breathe new life into the organized-labor movement. Two slices:

The Bureau of Labor Statistics released its annual report on union membership for 2025 on Wednesday, allowing for a complete appraisal of the Biden years. It shows that the union membership rate for all U.S. workers is 10 percent — down from when Biden took office in 2021. For private-sector workers, the rate is 5.9 percent, tied with 2024 for the record low.

It’s the continuation of a long-running downward trend in union membership. It has little to do with which party controls the White House or which labor policies a president pursues. The union membership rate has fallen during every presidential term since the 1980s. It fell by 0.4 percentage points during Donald Trump’s first term and by 0.3 percentage points during Biden’s term.

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The best proof, though, is that if joining a union got workers a big pay bump, the union membership rate wouldn’t be declining for as long as it has been, even when pro-union politicians are in office. Union membership rates have been falling across the developed world as the global economy becomes more competitive and outdated forms of organization no longer apply. Unions stick around in government, where there is no competition and outdated forms of organization are the rule.

George Will tells of the final stages of a case study of the warmth of collectivism: Cuba. Two slices:

The Museum of Socialism, a.k.a. Cuba, is plummeting in a tightening gyre. The 67-year-old Communist regime, which has existed during 14 U.S. presidencies (counting Donald Trump twice), might not survive into a 15th.

Its iron fist grips an island prison that has fewer than 11 million — perhaps under 9 million — inmates. In this decade, more than a million have escaped; the regime considers this partly a safety valve, exporting dissidents. Most have gone into America’s Cuban diaspora. “Cuban society is a rudderless, drifting hulk,” writes Juan Antonio Blanco, president of a Madrid-based think tank, in the Journal of Democracy. “Amid the institutional anomie, ordinary citizens endure a daily hell of ever-increasing hardships.”

Fidel Castro, who perhaps was a billionaire when he died in 2016, was proudly anti-bourgeois, telling Cubans: “We are not a consumer society.” He got that right. Cuba, a threadbare geopolitical irrelevancy, was once famous for cigars and sugar. It has had to import tobacco from Spain and sugar from Brazil.

The Financial Times reports that drivers wait hours to fill their gas tanks. Garbage accumulates in streets because refuse trucks lack fuel. Airlines avoid Havana because fuel is unavailable. Abandoned hotels, built for tourism that never materialized, line Havana’s waterfront. Soviet-era oil-fired electricity generators fail from lack of maintenance. People trek from the provinces to Havana to buy expensive candles that burn for about an hour.

Patients who need operations are told to bring to the hospital their own sheets, gauze, bandages, even scalpels. Writing in Foreign Affairs, Michael J. Bustamante, chair in Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami, says “an outbreak of dengue and other mosquito-borne viruses has reached epidemic proportions.”

In the 1930s, apologists for Joseph Stalin’s use of terror and engineered famine to produce socialism, complacently said, “You can’t make an omelet without breaking eggs.” George Orwell’s acid reply: “Where’s the omelet?” Mendicant Marxism, dependent for decades on Soviet subsidies, then on Venezuelan oil from the Hugo Chávez and Nicolás Maduro regimes, is discredited everywhere outside Western universities’ humanities departments.

…..

Eleven months before he was murdered by a Castro admirer, President John F. Kennedy, author of the feckless 1961 Bay of Pigs attempt to overthrow Castro’s regime, spoke in Miami to survivors of this fiasco. They gave him a Cuban flag. He vowed: “I can assure you that this flag will be returned to this brigade in a free Havana.” Planting that flag there will be easier than planting the institutional structures of freedom.

Speaking of socialism, David Henderson recently gave a lecture on it.

National Review‘s Andrew McCarthy explains that Trump’s new tariff hikes done under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 – a delegation of tariff-raising power meant to address “large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits” – are no less illegal than were the tariffs that Trump imposed under IEEPA, the reason being that the U.S. currently has no balance-of-payments deficit (and much less one that’s “large and serious”). Two slices:

In his pique after the Court’s correct and easily foreseeable 6-3 decision in Learning Resources v. Trump, invalidating the tariffs he unilaterally, haphazardly imposed in purported reliance on the 1977 International Emergency Economics Act (IEEPA), the president announced that he is imposing tariffs in purported reliance on the 1974 Trade Act. Specifically, he is decreeing what are called “Section 122” tariffs, a provision of the Trade Act codified at Section 2132 of Title 19, U.S. Code. They are to take effect come Tuesday.

These new tariffs are even more clearly illegal than Trump’s IEEPA tariffs.

I can’t improve on our editorial’s explication of Learning Resources, in particular of the bedrock separation of powers principles by which the Constitution vests in Congress, not the president, the power to tax — and tariffs are taxes (in this instance, massive taxes, overwhelmingly paid by Americans, not foreign regimes). The president has no inherent tariff authority; he has only the statutory authority Congress gives him.

In Section 122, Congress endowed the president with narrow, temporary authority to impose tariffs “to deal with large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits” (emphasis added). What Trump is complaining about — something he insists is a crisis but is not — is the balance of trade, not of payments. The United States does not have an overall balance of payments deficit, much less a large and serious one.

…..

There is no rationale under Section 122 to impose tariffs. Because President Trump has no unilateral authority to order tariffs, he must meet the preconditions of Section 122 to justify levying them. He cannot. Not even close.

Here’s the Cato Institute’s Clark Packard on the SCOTUS ruling against Trump’s IEEPA tariffs punitive taxes on Americans’ purchases of imports. Here’s his conclusion:

Unfettered use of Sections 122 and 338—along with better-known statutes like Sections 301 and 232—could essentially recreate the IEEPA predicament. In practice, this means the president can continue reshaping tax policy and the business environment on a whim, redistributing hundreds of billions of dollars and imposing pervasive uncertainty, without express congressional authorization.

The Court did important work by reining in the misuse of IEEPA. But judicial intervention can only go so far. Congress spent decades handing off its constitutional trade authority to the executive branch, and these delegations remain largely intact. Until lawmakers reclaim some of that authority and add serious procedural safeguards, the risk of arbitrary tariffs will continue.

The Court did its job. Now Congress needs to do its own.

Scott Lincicome accurately summarizes the Trump administration’s resistance to refunding the customs revenues that it illegally seized from Americans: “Sure, we stole from these companies, but returning the money we stole would be the ‘ultimate corporate welfare’.”

Dave Keating tweets: (HT Scott Lincicome)

New data shows US is the only major destination in the world to see a decline in international travellers in 2025. So far 2026 getting worse.

Foreign airlines cutting the number of US-bound flights. Disney warning of “international visitation headwinds”

Here’s Wall Street Journal columnist Barton Swaim on immigration enforcement:

I have no sage counsel, other than to say this: If illegal migrants are performing lawful, remunerative labor, they are, at that moment, contributing to the welfare of mankind and ought to be left alone. Work is a sacred activity. Nabbing people as they wait for jobs as roofers or drywallers, or raiding hotels and farms as they do useful things and earn money for themselves and their families, offends natural sensibilities. A great many natural-born citizens won’t work. Many more won’t do their best while on the clock. To punish noncitizens for engaging in productive behavior is to persecute the righteous. No good will come of it.

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Quotation of the Day…

… is from page 323 of the late University of Washington economist Paul Heyne‘s undated and previously unpublished manuscript titled “Teaching Economics By Telling Stories,” as it appears in the 2008 collection of Heyne’s writings, Are Economists Basically Immoral?” and Other Essays on Economics, Ethics, and Religion (Geoffrey Brennan and A.M.C. Waterman, eds.):

We want to understand how markets work, and they do not work in isolation from political and ethical forces.

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The Data on 2025 U.S. GDP Are Now In…

and GDP growth last year was not especially impressive.

Using the most generous measure of U.S. GDP growth (Q4 2025 over Q4 2024), U.S. GDP in 2025 grew by 2.2 percent. In light of Phil Gramm’s and my recent comparison of the first full calendar year (2025) of Trump 2.0 with the first full calendar year (2017) of Trump 1.0, we can now confidently say that GDP grew significantly more slowly in 2025 than it grew in 2017, when it grew by 3.0 percent.

Please note that by comparing GDP growth in the high-tariff year of 2025 with GDP growth in 2017 – the year before Trump began tariffing – I am not saying that the slower growth in 2025 was definitely caused by the tariffs. I’m saying simply that a comparison of the two different annual GDP-growth rates cannot support the Trumpian boast that his aggressive second-term tariffing is an unquestionable boon to the American economy.

I do suspect that the 2025 tariffs did indeed cause the U.S. economy in 2025 to grow less than it would have grown without the tariffs, but this blog post isn’t a research paper. To establish firmly that the tariffs depressed economic growth in 2025, and by how much, requires more research. But, again, the data that are now in greatly decrease the plausibility of the claim that we Americans should applaud the economic consequences of Trump’s 2025 tariffs.

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Some Links for a True Liberation Day

Scott Lincicome was quickly out of the blocks after yesterday’s U.S. Supreme Court ruling striking down the tariffs that Trump illegally imposed under the IEEPA statute. Two slices:

In a press conference after the ruling on Friday, Mr. Trump acknowledged that his team had been studying these and other laws as fall-back options, and he announced a slate of new actions to replace his IEEPA tariffs. This includes the current 232 actions, initiating new investigations under Section 301, and imposing a global 10% tariff under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, which empowers the president to address “large and serious” balance-of-payments deficits via global tariffs of up to 15% for no more than 150 days (after which Congress must act to continue the tariffs). The administration might later consider Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930—a short and ambiguous law that authorizes the president to impose tariffs of up to 50% on imports from countries that have “discriminated” against U.S. commerce—but this is legally riskier.

These measures will create global tariff regime similar to what Trump imposed under IEEPA. The main difference—and the main benefit for America’s economy and trading partners—would rest in how the president does so. IEEPA was essentially an Oval Office “tariff switch” that Mr. Trump could flip on and off at any time, for any reason and in any amount. This created massive uncertainty and crippling complexity for businesses, foreign governments and the U.S. economy. The alternative authorities, by contrast, have substantive and procedural guardrails that limit their size and scope or, at the very least, give companies time to prepare for tariffs (or lobby against them).

To be sure, “guardrails” is a relative term for a president who has already stretched Section 232’s “national security” rationale to cover whipped-cream cans and bathroom vanities. And the courts have largely rubber-stamped the administration’s previous moves under Sections 232 and 301—a big reason why the tariff Plan B will feature them. Abuse is likely, as is more litigation. And unlike with IEEPA, we shouldn’t expect the courts to save us.

The justices’ ruling is an important victory for constitutional governance and will eliminate the most destabilizing element of Mr. Trump’s tariff regime. But until Congress reclaims some of its constitutional authority over U.S. trade policy and limits the president’s legal tariff powers, costly and erratic tariffs will remain the norm in the U.S., to our economy’s great detriment.

Here’s Dartmouth’s great trade economist, Doug Irwin, writing in The Economist. A slice:

The historic ruling is critically important beyond its implications for current trade policy. Had the court not limited Mr Trump’s actions, presidential power on import tariffs would have been completely unchecked by any congressional legislation and untethered to any congressional opinion. If the government had won, this administration and future administrations could have declared an emergency, however frivolous, and imposed steep taxes. As the brief for VOS and several other companies put it, the president could “impose tariffs on the American people whenever he wants, at whatever level he wants, against whatever countries and products he wants, and for as long as he wants”, simply by declaring an emergency that is “unreviewable”.

In oral argument, a hypothetical case was raised of a Democratic administration declaring a climate emergency and imposing high tariffs on imported electric vehicles or diesel trucks as they saw fit. One person could dictate policy without approval from Congress, the representatives of the people. This would have been a radical rewrite of the constitution.

Jane Shaw Stroup reminds us of what is threatened by protective tariffs. Here’s her conclusion:

That’s why today’s Supreme Court ruling was important. It’s a reminder that prosperity is not guaranteed. The world’s economic ascent has been built on openness—on the ability of goods, people, and ideas to move cheaply and freely. Re‑erecting barriers through tariffs risks undoing gains that lifted billions out of poverty and reshaped the human condition.

[DBx: Long experience at debating trade policy prompts me to add this further point, one that I know Jane agrees with: Free trade’s lifting of billions of people around the world out of poverty did not come at the expense of Americans; this free trade also made us Americans richer.]

The Editorial Board of the Wall Street Journal applauds the Court’s ruling in Learning Resources v. Trump. A slice:

The Administration’s strongest argument is that it deserves deference on questions that implicate foreign affairs. The dissent agrees. But as Justice Gorsuch notes in a brilliant concurrence, this logic would have required the Court to uphold the Obama Clean Power plan in West Virginia v. EPA (2022) since climate change is an international issue.

Justice Gorsuch acknowledges that “the major questions doctrine may speak with less force where the President and Congress enjoy “overlap[ping] . . . authority” under the Constitution. But the Constitution expressly vests the power over taxation and foreign commerce with Congress, not the President.

Justice Gorsuch also amusingly hoists the liberal Justices on their prior dissents that criticized the use of the major-questions doctrine in cases involving overreaches by Democratic Presidents. “Their approach today is difficult to square with how they have interpreted other statutes,” he writes. Yes, it is.

The Wall Street Journal‘s Editorial Board also rightly condemns Trump for his utterly inappropriate and baseless criticisms of the Justices who dared rule against his exercise of power. A slice:

This is ugly even by Mr. Trump’s standards. He’s accusing them of betraying the U.S. at the behest of nefarious interests he didn’t identify, no doubt because they don’t exist. Asked about Justices Gorsuch and Barrett, whom he appointed, Mr. Trump called them “an embarrassment to their families.”

This is rhetoric that could cause some deranged Trump acolyte to turn to violence against a Justice. It’s as bad as Sen. Chuck Schumer’s threat in 2020 that Justices Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh had “released the whirlwind and you will pay the price!” Recall the nut who stalked Justice Kavanaugh’s home in 2022, after the leak of the Court’s draft opinion overturning Roe v. Wade. We hope all nine Justices appear next week at the State of the Union address as a show of self-protective solidarity.

The Editorial Board of the Washington Post calls yesterday’s tariff ruling “a triumph for the separation of powers and individual liberty.” A slice:

Congress never approved the worldwide tariffs at issue in the case. Trump told the court they were authorized by a 1977 law, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. No president has used IEEPA to impose tariffs, but it contains the phrase “regulate … importation.” Trump said that was sufficient authorization for him to throw out the rest of the tariff schedules and set import taxes however he pleased.

Roberts saw the flimsiness of that reasoning. “Based on two words separated by 16 others,” he wrote, “the President asserts the independent power to impose tariffs on imports from any country, of any product, at any rate, for any amount of time. Those words cannot bear such weight.” Indeed. The executive branch can’t be allowed to grab hundreds of billions of dollars from the American people on such a thin legal basis.

Reading between the lines, there’s a sense that Trump’s frenetic alteration of tariff rates weighed on the court. The opinion notes that under Trump’s reading of the law, he is “free to issue a dizzying array of modifications at will” — and indeed he has. Tariffs have become a lobbying bonanza as companies campaign for exemptions and carveouts.

Also applauding the SCOTUS ruling against Trump’s IEEPA tariffs are the Editors of National Review. A slice:

While the Court’s conservatives were equally divided in this case, we believe that the majority (which included two of Trump’s three appointees to the Court, Justices Neil Gorsuch and Amy Coney Barrett) had much the better of the argument that the extraordinary, limitless delegation of the most central power possessed by Congress needs to hang on language more specific than what IEEPA says. In so holding, the Court was faithful to the same principles it repeatedly cited to constrain Biden on student loans, the eviction moratorium, the workplace vaccine mandate, and carbon emission rules. That means the Court is doing its job — which is why progressives hate it. The right should not sing from that hymnal.

The president’s furious and intemperate response — effectively accusing the justices in the majority of being bought off by foreign powers and suggesting that Democrats might have a point in calls for Court-packing — was not only irresponsible, but also completely politically unhelpful to his own cause. It’s also not apt to win him more friends on a bench that still has many other cases on its docket regarding his powers and his initiatives.

“Small business owners celebrate Supreme Court striking down Trump’s tariffs” – so reports Reason‘s Jack Nicastro.

Using four charts, Adam Michel and Santiago Forster make clear some of the fiscal consequences of yesterday’s SCOTUS ruling.

Those tariff costs offset a majority of the average $3,736 tax cut Americans are projected to receive in 2026 from the OBBBA. Considering both policies together, Figure 4 shows that the bottom two income groups face a net tax increase, decreasing their after-tax income by between 1.2 percent and 0.3 percent. Middle- and higher-income Americans see small net tax cuts of between 0.3 and 0.6 percent of after-tax income. Overturning the IEEPA tariffs will allow more Americans to fully benefit from the 2025 tax cuts.

Also writing about the fiscal impact – or relative lack thereof – of the SCOTUS ruling against Trump’s IEEPA tariffs is my intrepid Mercatus Center colleague, Veronique de Rugy. A slice:

What about the $18 trillion in investment pledges that the tariffs were used to extract from foreign governments and companies? If the gun is taken away, do the promises made at gunpoint disappear with it?

Well, the thing is, most of those promises were never really what they seemed in the first place, as Scott Lincicome’s detailed analysis at The Dispatch shows. So before you panic about the $18 trillion in investment that Trump claimed his tariffs had secured, it’s worth understanding what that number actually was. It was, in short, mostly fiction.

Alex Tabarrok concludes that the initial appeal of one of the points made by the SCOTUS dissenters dissolves upon careful inspection. A slice:

Congress wants the President to move fast in a real emergency, but it doesn’t want to hand over routine control of trade policy. The right delegation design is therefore a screening device: give the President authority he will exercise only when the situation is truly an emergency.

An import ban works as a screening device precisely because it is very disruptive. A ban creates immediate and substantial harm.  It is a “costly signal.” A President who invokes it is credibly saying: this is serious enough that I am willing to absorb a large cost. Tariffs, in contrast, are cheaper–especially to the President. Tariffs raise revenue, which offsets political pain. Tariff incidence is diffuse and easy to misattribute—prices creep, intermediaries take blame, consumers don’t observe the policy lever directly. Most importantly tariffs are adjustable, which makes them a weapon useful for bargaining, exemptions, and targeted favors. Tariffs under executive authority implicitly carry the message–I am the king; give me a gold bar and I will reduce your tariffs. Tariff flexibility is more politically appealing than a ban and thus a less credible signal of an emergency. The “lesser-included” argument gets the logic backwards. The asymmetry is the point.

Not surprisingly, the same structure appears in real emergency services. A fire chief may have the authority to close roads during an emergency but that doesn’t imply that the fire chief has the authority to impose road tolls. Road closure is costly and self-limiting — it disrupts traffic, generates immediate complaints, and the chief has every incentive to lift it as soon as possible. Tolls are cheap, adjustable, and once in place tend to persist; they generate revenue that can fund the agency and create constituencies for their continuation. Nobody thinks granting a fire chief emergency closure authority implicitly grants them taxing authority, even if the latter is a lesser authority. The closure and toll instruments have completely different political economy properties despite operating on the same roads.

The majority reaches the right conclusion by noting that tariffs are a tax over which Congress, not the President, has authority. That is constitutionally correct but the deeper question is why the Framers lodged the taxing power in Congress — and the answer is political economy. Revenue instruments are especially easy for an executive to exploit because they can be targeted. The constitutional rule exists to solve that incentive problem.

Once you see that, the dissent’s “greater includes the lesser” inference collapses on its own terms. A principal can rationally authorize am agent to take a dramatic emergency action while withholding the cheaper, revenue-lever not despite the fact that it seems milder, but because of it. The blunt instrument is self-limiting. The revenue instrument is not. That asymmetry is what the Constitution’s categorical division of powers preserves — and what an open-ended emergency delegation would destroy.

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Quotation of the Day…

… is from page 162 of the original edition of volume III (“The Political Order of a Free People,” 1979) of F.A. Hayek’s Law, Legislation, and Liberty:

Even today the overwhelming majority of people, including, I am afraid, a good many supposed economists, do not yet understand that this extensive social division of labour, based on widely dispersed information, has been made possible entirely by the use of those impersonal signals which emerge from the market process and tell people what to do in order to adapt their activities to events of which they have no direct knowledge. That in an economic order involving a far-ranging division of labour it can no longer be the pursuit of perceived common ends but only abstract rules of conduct … is an insight which most people still refuse to accept.

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Some Links

The Editorial Board of the Washington Post justly criticizes White House advisor Kevin Hassett for calling for punishing researchers who publish conclusions that the White House finds to be politically inconvenient. A slice:

Having access to more information is a good thing — especially if you’re the National Economic Council director whose ability to do the job relies on data. But White House economic advisor Kevin Hassett would prefer to “discipline” researchers whose calculations are inconvenient for the Trump administration’s defense of tariffs.

Last week the Federal Reserve Bank of New York posted an analysis of how Trump’s tariff hikes affected prices in 2025. U.S. border taxes stood at 2.6 percent at the beginning of the year and 13 percent at the end. Who pays them? According to the study, the bulk of the tariff cost — 86 percent in November — was borne by U.S. importers. Foreign exporters adjusted their prices only modestly.

Hassett wasn’t pleased with the analysis, which was authored by Federal Reserve staff and a Columbia University economics professor. “It’s, I think, the worst paper I’ve ever seen in the history of the Federal Reserve system,” he said on CNBC Wednesday. “The people associated with this paper should presumably be disciplined, because what they’ve done is they’ve put out a conclusion which has created a lot of news that’s highly partisan based on analysis that wouldn’t be accepted in a first-semester econ class.”

In fact, the finding — that taxing something raises its cost — is consistent with not only Econ 101 but other professional research on how tariffs affect prices. Isn’t the point of tariffs, after all, to raise the price of foreign goods so Americans will buy domestic goods instead?

The Wall Street Journal‘s Editorial Board criticizes the Trump administration’s refusal to acknowledge the truth about tariffs – a truth obviously embarrassing to Trump. A slice:

Clearly the White House is worried that voters might conclude this research aligns with their own experience. Kevin Hassett, director of the National Economic Council, took to CNBC Wednesday to pan the New York Fed research as “the worst paper I’ve ever seen in the history of the Federal Reserve System” and suggested the people who wrote and published it should be “disciplined.” Disciplined how? Put in stocks? For a tariff paper?

The Fed analysis aligns with other research into the distribution of tariff costs from Harvard economists and Germany’s Kiel Institute—and with common sense. There isn’t widespread evidence that foreign producers are cutting their prices to offset the tariffs, the main mechanism by which foreigners would “pay” for the border taxes.

Nor is the dollar strengthening, which is the other possible mechanism for making foreigners pay (we’ll spare you the equations). Instead the tariffs are causing an increase in post-tariff prices of those goods that are still imported, alongside a modest decrease in the volume of imports. Americans pay higher prices, or “pay” in the form of less choice.

In his more honest moments, Mr. Trump admits this is the effect, if not the intention, of his tariffs. That’s what he meant when he said last year that Americans may have to buy fewer dolls for their children as a result of his trade policies. The handful of economists who support his tariffs believe the border taxes rebalance the global economy specifically by deterring American consumption.

The Fed research and similar papers try to put some numbers on these phenomena. The serious kernel of Mr. Hassett’s complaint, to the extent there is one, is that the New York Fed economists overlooked a wide range of other ways the tariffs could affect the U.S. economy, such as stimulating reshoring of production and an increase in domestic wages.

But such an analysis also probably wouldn’t flatter the Trump tariffs. So far the manufacturing boom Mr. Trump promised hasn’t appeared, as manufacturing jobs are down over the last year. The New York Fed and other research on cost distribution shows one reason why: To the extent American companies eat some of the costs of tariffs, that’s less cash available for investment and hiring.

The Trump economy has been as healthy as it is despite the tariffs, not because of them. The market response to his April 2025 “liberation” tariffs was so negative that the President quickly withdrew them and negotiated lower tariffs as part of “trade deals” that may turn out to be partly illusory. He has also laced the tariffs with multiple exemptions. A dollop of tax reform, a big dose of deregulation and an AI investment boom are allowing the economy to cope with the tariff distortions and uncertainty.

Scott Lincicome exposes the many fallacies that infect Trump’s boast about the allegedly enormous sums of investment funds his tariffs, and tariff threats, are attracting into the U.S. Two slices:

My Cato Institute colleague Alan Reynolds works his way through the figures and finds several basic errors. First, he looks at the Fed’s 2025 foreign investment data and finds no evidence of a significant uptick. In fact, FDI “grew 23% more rapidly during the Biden years, 2021–24, than it did in the first three quarters of 2025.”

Broader domestic investment figures were similarly unspectacular last year, particularly in the manufacturing sector that Trump is targeting: “growth of US fixed investment in plant and equipment was relatively weak last year. … Real investment has been rapidly falling in manufacturing structures (factories)—the opposite of the President’s familiar justification for high and erratic tariffs on imported manufactured goods (to ‘rebuild American manufacturing’).”

The obvious rebuttal to these figures is that Trump’s investment figures are prospective—meaning they represent investments to come, not spending that has already happened. And that’s a fine point, given the announcements’ timing. Yet here, too, there are plenty of problems. For starters, the only actual evidence the White House has offered of a tariff-fueled “Trump Effect” on domestic investment is a list of 132 “private and foreign investment” announcements it claims was “made possible by President Trump’s leadership.” But even that totals just $9.6 trillion—a little more than half of what Trump keeps claiming.

This hefty sum, moreover, is also wildly exaggerated. A Bloomberg analysis of the White House’s “investment” list shows that about $2.6 trillion isn’t investment at all. Instead, it’s routine U.S. business expenses (e.g., worker training) or vague commitments to purchase U.S. goods. Some of those commitments, moreover, relate to military equipment that foreign governments (e.g., Saudi Arabia) already wanted to buy. Others, such as India’s promises to stop buying Russian oil and start buying U.S. liquid natural gas, might never happen for practical and geopolitical reasons. Others still—as is the case of the EU’s purchase promises—simply can’t happen because government officials in these places don’t have the authority to control private firms’ purchasing decisions.

The remaining $7 trillion on the White House list is split evenly between U.S. firms and overseas governments and companies, but there are big red flags here, too. “Most of the biggest investment plans,” Reynolds explains, came from large multinational corporations—Apple, Meta, Nvidia, Microsoft, Google, Micron, IBM, Eli Lilly, Pfizer, Merck, Johnson &Johnson, and AbbVie—that were already investing heavily in the United States and had already planned even more spending in the future, long before any tariff-induced “Trump Effect.”

…..

A comprehensive review would also need to consider the resources (capital, labor, materials, etc.) any forced investments take away from other possible projects, as well as what might have happened to investment in the U.S. without all of Trump’s tariffs and threats. As economist John Cochrane recently noted in this regard, some of the administration’s efforts to remove “regulatory and legal barriers to making the investment or making a profit on it in the US” are worthwhile and may have encouraged new spending in key sectors without “bludgeon[ing] other countries with tariffs to get the investment.”* He also cautions that “government-directed investment from other governments is not usually known for its focus on efficiency,” raising the risk that some of these investments become yet another U.S. industrial policy boondoggle. Influential writer and energy entrepreneur Austin Vernon seemingly concurs in his recent deep dive on the future of U.S. manufacturing, warning that tariffs (and industrial policy) will encourage the wrong type of manufacturing, reduce total output, and also divert finite policy attention away from things like regulatory reform that actually can move the investment needle in the direction we want.

Finally, a comprehensive review of the “Trump Effect” also will need to consider how Trump’s tariffs and threats may have discouraged other investments—or prodded full-on divestment—due to the higher costs and uncertainty that accompany them. As I just wrote for Bloomberg, there are increasing signs—in global trade flows, foreign investment data, and new trade agreements—that companies and governments are slowly diversifying away from the increasingly unreliable United States.

The U.S. trade deficit in goods is a concept that would be completely lacking any economic relevance were it not for the fact that politicians – and especially those now in charge at the White House – think it to be relevant and, therefore, craft trade policy to address this economic irrelevancy. Yet even on that front, the allegedly curative trade policies are failing.

My intrepid Mercatus Center colleague, Veronique de Rugy, continues her noble crusade against fiscal incontinence. A slice:

Between now and 2036, the CBO projects $94.6 trillion in federal spending against $70.2 trillion in revenue, a decadelong deficit of $24.4 trillion. Outlays reached 23.1 percent of GDP in 2025, nearly two full percentage points above the 50-year average, meaning annual spending growth is outpacing the economy itself. Debt held by the public is projected to hit 101 percent of GDP this year, which will surpass the post-WWII record of 106 percent by 2030, and climb to 120 percent by 2036.

Here’s Michael Magoon on the Scottish Enlightenment and the commercial society. (HT Arnold Kling)

GMU Econ alum Julia Cartwright, writing in the Washington Post, draws lessons about money from the Winter Olympics. A slice:

For generations, people bit gold coins to verify that they were genuine. Gold is a relatively soft metal, so a pure gold coin would show a faint tooth mark. If a coin were diluted with a harder metal, or merely plated in gold, your teeth would quickly tell the difference. The bite was not kitsch. It was quality control.

Ed Crane is remembered by Johan Norberg, José Piñera, Vernon Smith, and other friends of liberty.

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Here’s a letter to the Washington Free Beacon.

Editor:

Thanks for publishing Ira Stoll’s insightful criticisms of Oren Cass’s latest denigration of the financial industry (“’The Finance Industry Is a Grift,’ Oren Cass Claims in the New York Times. Look Who’s Talking.” February 10).

Mr. Cass peddles the physicalist fallacy, which is the false notion that only activities that churn out the likes of lumber, steel, automobiles, and other tangible things are truly productive – or at least are more productive than activities that produce services. That Mr. Cass’s does indeed peddle this fallacy is evident from his many denunciations of free trade, which he blames for the U.S. consistently running merchandise-trade deficits, and for the American economy generating fewer manufacturing jobs than he has somehow divined should be generated.

This physicalist fallacy naturally fuels Mr. Cass’s antipathy to finance. Finance, in his view, produces nothing – a view that Mr. Stoll explains is hopelessly distorted.

It’s interesting to note that Mr. Cass’s organization, American Compass, has among its major supporters the Omidyar Network. Pierre Omidyar earned his fortune by founding eBay and then enhancing the profitability of that e-commerce site by acquiring Paypal in 2002 for $1.5 billion. In 2015 Paypal was spun off from eBay at a price of $50 billion.

Paypal produces nothing tangible; it ‘merely’ eases the moving around of money. Paypal is a finance company.

If Mr. Cass were correct that finance is “grift,” then large swathes of the financial support for his organization are ill-gotten gains.

Mr. Cass will likely protest that Paypal differs from other financiers, but this protest will be tendentious. The fact is, Paypal’s profits are honestly earned through its success at assisting people to more easily achieve their economic goals – just as are the profits earned by other financial-market activities. These gains are in no way ill-gotten – a reality that renders highly ironic Mr. Cass’s use of financial-market profits to berate financial-market profits as ill-gotten.

Sincerely,
Donald J. Boudreaux
Professor of Economics
and
Martha and Nelson Getchell Chair for the Study of Free Market Capitalism at the Mercatus Center
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA 22030

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